

JAINISM

THROUGH PRAKRT SOURCES

BY

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FOREWORD

The Department of Philosophy was started in the University of Madras in September 1927. In August 1964 it was raised to the status of a Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy by the University Grants Commission. From 1976 it has come to be known as the Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy.

Since its inception in 1927, this Department has kept in view two major objectives: (1) the study of Indian systems of thought and (2) the study of other systems of thought. Last year the Department arranged for a course of special lectures in furtherance of these objectives.

At the invitation of the Radhakrishnan Institute, Dr. T. G. Kalghatgi delivered three lectures on Jainism during March 1978. The present volume contains the substance of his lectures. As part of the Golden Jubilee Celebrations of the Department, the special lectures delivered at this Institute are brought out as Golden Jubilee Publications. The Institute is grateful to Dr. Kalghatgi for permission to publish his lectures in the Golden Jubilee Series.

The Institute wishes to thank the Government of Tamil Nadu, Professor G. R. Damodaran, the Vice-Chancellor, and the other authorities of the University of Madras for the financial aid given for these publications. The Institute is appreciative of the interest evinced by the University Grants Commission in upgrading the parent Department into a Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, financing it for ten years (1964-74) and for its subsequent and sustained interest in the progress of the Institute.

The Institute is grateful to Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri for laying the foundations of the Department on sound

lines, to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan, former Director of the Institute for building up the Department over a period of three and a half decades by his devoted services and to Dr. V. A. Devasenapathi who, during the tenure of his Directorship of the Institute, was responsible for planning and organizing the Special Lecture series to commemorate the Golden Jubilee year of the Department.

The General Editor wishes to thank his colleague, Dr. T. S. Devadoss, for seeing the manuscript through the press, and Rathnam Press for the prompt and neat execution of the work.

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

P R E F A C E

I am greatly honoured by the invitation of the Dr. S. Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy to deliver the following lectures on Jainism, to commemorate the Golden Jubilee year of the Department of Philosophy.

Studies in Jainism in the West have been recent but significantly important. With the publication of *Āyārāṅga* in the Sacred Books of the East Series in 1884 and the *Uttarajīhāyana* in 1895, researches in Jainology have attained international status. Enormous work has been done in the study and interpretation of Jaina thought. So far, emphasis has been laid on the editing of the ancient manuscripts. There is much scope for reinterpretation of concepts of Jainism in the light of modern Western philosophy.

In the course of these three lectures on 'Jainism' (through the *Prākṛt* sources), I have analysed and presented some fundamental problems in Jaina Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics and Ethics against the backdrop of modern philosophical approaches. My scope is strictly limited as my discussions have to be based on the *Prākṛt* sources only. Later developments in Jaina Philosophy, as presented in the Samskr̥t commentaries have not been referred to. However, in some cases, Samskr̥t texts pertaining to the doctrines and their interpretations have been mentioned, in order to highlight the issues. References to various original sources and the commentaries thereon have been given at the end of each lecture in the foot notes.

I am grateful to the authorities of the University of Madras, and Dr. V. A. Devasenapathi, the former Director of the Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, for giving me this opportunity of presenting my interpretation of the fundamental concepts of Jaina Philosophy through *Prākṛt* sources in the light of modern philosophical thought.

My thanks are due to Dr. R. Balasubramanian, the present Director of the Institute for the interest taken in my lectures and its publication. I wish to express my appreciation to my friend Dr. T. S. Devadoss, Reader in Philosophy at the University of Madras, for his kind help in seeing the manuscript through the press.

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October 2, 1971

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Jaina Logic and Epistemology

1. In India we have seen that, for centuries, the stream of thought, which constitutes Indian philosophy and culture, has flowed in a harmonious way. The Indian thought is a synthesis of the Vedic and the Śramaṇic streams. Jainism, Buddhism, and we may say Śaivism, belong to the Śramaṇa current of thought. Jainism is a religion preached by the Jinas and *Jina* is a perfected soul who preaches the law to the suffering humanity. He is one who has conquered the passions.

Jainism is a Pre-Aryan religion which prevailed even before Mahāvīra and Pārśvanātha, the twenty-third *tīrthāṅkara*. The life incidents of Nemi, the twenty-second *tīrthāṅkara*, has been associated with the Kṛṣṇa legend in the Mahābhārata. Jaina tradition traces the beginnings of Jainism in this eon to Rṣabha, the first *tīrthāṅkara*. Rṣabha has been referred to in the *Rg-Veda*, *Yajur-Veda* and *Bhāgawata Purāṇa* and other Hindu works. *Rg-Veda* mentions Rṣabha, Ajita and Ariṣṭanemi, with respect. Jacobi traces Jainism to the early primitive currents of animistic thought.¹ Zimmer admits the possibility of a pre-Aryan Jaina thought much before Pārśva, the twenty-third *tīrthāṅkara*.² Suffice it to say that Jainism belongs to the early animistic currents of thought. However we get the teachings of Mahāvīra in crystallised form, although it contains the tradition of the earlier *tīrthāṅkaras*. Jainism is not to be considered merely as a religion, but a philosophy and a view of life. It is a *Darśana*. Jaina philosophy can be studied under three heads: (A) Jaina Logic and Epistemology, (B) Metaphysics and (C) Ethics. A study of these problems requires a brief survey of the source material that we can find

1. Jacobi (Hermann): *Studies in Jainism*—Jainism.

2. Zimmer (H): *Philosophies of India*—pp. 217.

in the canonical literature. Shri Devendra Muni Shastri has classified the Jaina Philosophical literature into five divisions.³

1. The age of the Āgamas.
2. The age of the formation of the Anekānta view.
3. The age of the Pramāṇa Śāstra.
4. The Neo-Nyāya age.

and 5. Modern age of editing and interpretation of the classics. We shall construct the Jaina philosophical thought from the gleanings out of the Āgamic literature, which is primarily in Prākṛit sources, although we cannot deny the important part Sanskrit texts played in the development of Jaina thought. The development of Jaina thought has been phenomenal. Jaina literature in regional languages like Kannada, Tamil, Gujarati and Hindi has been enormous.

2. The period of Āgamas may be traced to the time of *parinirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra in 527 B.C. The teachings of Mahāvīra has been collated by the Gaṇadharas. The conceptual content of the teachings is the *arthāgama*. This content has been crystallised in the form of sūtrās by the disciples. It is *sūtrāgama*.⁴

Without entering into the controversy regarding the extent of the nature of the Āgamas, we shall enumerate the salient features of the Āgamic literature, making a brief mention of the Śvetāmbara and Digambara points of view. From the point of view of the structure of the Āgamic literature we have two distinctions: *Anga pravīṣṭa*, which consists of the original teachings of

3. Devendra Muni Shastri: *Jaina Darśana—Svarūpa Our Vislesana* (Hindi)—
Taraka Guru (Jaina Granthamala 1975), pp. 19.
See also his *Jaina Āgama*.
4. Āvasyaka Niryukti: 192. and also 89–90.

“Tavaniyamaṇārukkaṇṭa ḍroḍho kevali abhiyanāni I
Tō moyai nānavuṭṭhi bhaviyajāṇaviccchaṇṭṭa II
Tam buddhimaēṇa padēṇa gaṇaharā girihauṇ niravasēsam I
Tittaya bhāsiyāim gandhanti taō pavaṇṭṭha niravasēsam 89–90
Attham dāsai arabā suttam ganthanti gaṇaharā niūṇam I
Sāsāṇasa hiyaṭṭiās taē suttam pavattē II 192.

Mahāvīra codified by the Gaṇadharas and the explanations given by the elder Munis. From the point of language, canonical literature can be classified into two eras—the 1st era is from 400 B.C. to 100 A.D. The Āgamas written during this period are in Ardhamagadhi. The second era can be stated to be from 100 A.D. to 500 A.D. and the writings in this period have been in Jaina Mahārāṣtri Prākrit. The twelvefold Āṅga literature can be mentioned as: (1) Ācārāṅga, (2) Sūtrakṛta, (3) Sthānāṅga, (4) Samavāya, (5) Vyākhyāprajnapti, (6) Nāthadharmakathā, (7) Upāsakādhyayana; (8) Anthahkr̥ddasā, (9) Anuttaroupapādikadasā, (10) Praśnavyākaraṇa, (11) Vipākasūtra and (12) Drṣṭivāda.

In addition to the Āṅgas we have works which are called Upāṅgas. The term Upāṅga was first used by Ācārya Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya*.⁵ Then there are the *Cheda sūtrās*. *Daśavaikālika* and *Uttarādhyayana* are the mūla sūtras. *Nandi* and *Anuyogadvāra* are the Cūlika sūtras. At the basis of all the canonical and perhaps the earlier part of the Āgamas, are the Pūrvas, which are considered to be the original teachings of *tīrthāṅkaras*. The Pūrvas have presented the subtle metaphysical problems and also the prevailing philosophical schools. There are fourteen Pūrvas. There is a difference of opinion among the Śvetāmbara and Digambara scholars regarding the availability of the Pūrvas. The Digambara tradition does not accept the view that the Pūrva literature is not extinct. The original Pūrvas are not to be found, although the essential teachings of the Pūrvas have been incorporated in the Āṅga and the Upāṅga literature.

A fundamental question arises regarding the authenticity and continuity of the Jaina tradition through the teachings of the twenty-four *tīrthāṅkaras*. Was there not the possibility of variations and changes in the content of the Pūrvas and also the Āṅga literature with reference to different conditions of time, as long periods of time have elapsed? The Ācārāṅga sūtra points out that there is uniformity and continuity in the teachings of the *tīrthāṅkaras* as presented in the Āṅga literature, because the Arihantas had the same approach to the problems of life, and

5. *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya*: Tīkā pp. 23.

their teachings are similar.⁶ From the noumenal point of view, the Jaina canonical literature is eternal (*Sāsvata*). But from the practical point of view the canons are *Pouruṣeya*, as they were given by the *tīrthāṅkaras*.⁷

3. Jainas have made significant contributions to Indian Logic and Epistemology. Anekānta view and the Syādvāda are the fundamental principles of Jaina thought. The Jaina attitude towards life is synoptic and melioristic. To get rid of the cycle of worldly existence was the common end of the ancient Indian philosophers. Suffering is the fact of life. The Upaniṣadic philosophers found the immutable reality behind the world of phenomena. The Buddha denounced everything as momentary and fleeting. But Mahāvira adhered to the commonsense and found no contradiction between permanence and change. He was free from all dogmatism, free from all absolutism. He did not believe in absolute permanence and absolute change. Truth reveals itself to an impartial thinker. It is free from absolutist and dogmatic assertion about an aspect of truth. Reality is complex and we can look at reality from different points of view. Truth is like a many coloured dome. Each point of view presents a facet of truth. To recognise that there are other points of view and other facets of truth is the cardinal point of the Anekānta attitude. The Anekānta attitude is foundational to Jaina thought.

The origin of the doctrine of Anekānta can be seen from the study of the solutions to philosophical problems as given by Mahāvira. These problems were considered by the Buddha as "Avyākṛta", in-expressible. We may refer to the dialogues between Mahāvira and his disciple Gautama Gaṇadhara:

"Are the souls, O Lord, eternal or non-eternal?"

"The souls, O Gautama, are eternal in some respect and non -eternal in some respect"—

6. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra*: 126.

7. *Āvadyaka Nirvukti*: 89-90 (quoted above).

"They are eternal, from the view-point of substance and non-eternal from the view point of modes".⁸

Mahāvīra explained the problem of finiteness and infiniteness of the world (*loke*) with reference to substance (*dravya*), place (*kṣetra*), time (*kāla*) and nature (*bhāva*).⁹

The problem of the relation of body and soul was also explained by Mahāvīra in terms of Anekānta view:

"Is the body, O Lord, (identical with) the soul or is it different from the soul?"

"The body, O Gautama, is (identical with) the soul in some respect and different from the soul in some respect"¹⁰

In the Aṅga literature the doctrine of Anekānta was briefly discussed. But in the commentaries of the Jaina scriptures written in Prākrit, it has received greater attention. Later systematic exposition of the doctrine was given by Jaina scholars like, Samantabhadra, Siddhasenadivākara, Akalanka, Vidyānandi and others.

Anekānta view emphasises that reality is complex; truth is many-sided. It can be looked at from different points of view. It emphasises a catholic out-look towards all that we see and experience. It implies that others' views may also be true. It negates dogmatism and it respects the others' points of view. But to look at reality from a particular point of view and to insist that the point of view presented is the only point of view which is true is the one-sided approach to the problem. It is ekānta. It is dogmatism. Anekānta does imply the principle of reciprocity and interaction among the reals of the universe, as was later given by Kant, although this principle is more implied and expressed in Anekānta view. The Jaina is a through-going realist. Anekānta is the foundational out-look of the Jainas in looking at reality. This attitude has been crystallised into two forms:

8. *Bhagavati Sūtra*: VII-2.273.

9. *Ibid.* II, 190.

10. *Ibid.* II, 190.

(a) Nayavāda and (b) Syādvāda. Nayavāda is primarily psychological in content. It is the psychological expression of the fundamental Anekānta attitude. It is the analytic method of investigating a particular stand point of factual situations. Syādvāda is a logical expression of Anekānta in propositional forms. Syādvāda is primarily synthetic and it is designed to harmonise the different view points arrived at through the nayas. Nayavāda is primarily (conceptual) while Syādvāda is synthetic and verbal.¹¹

Naya refers to the point of view that one takes when one looks at the object. *Naya* expresses the partial truth about an object as known by a knowing subject. The Jainas give the analogy of the elephant and the seven blind men. The Jainas have formulated a methodological scheme of looking at reality in some determined ways. These are the *nayas*. There has been difference of opinion regarding the number of *nayas*. There are three traditions. The first tradition adopts seven *nayas*. The second tradition mentions six *nayas* and the third tradition has mentioned five *nayas*. Āgamas have mentioned two points of view: (1) *Saṅgraha naya*, the synthetic point of view of the universal and (2) *Paryāyika-naya*, the view-point of the particular.

On the basis of the considerations regarding the different points of view we can mention the conceptual content of the seven *nayas*:

(1) *Naigama naya*: It refers to the purpose or the end of an activity. For instance, if a man, carrying firewood, were to be asked what he is doing, he would reply that he is cooking. Cooking is the object for which he is carrying firewood.

(2) *Saṅgraha naya* is a synthetic point of view. It gives prominence to the seeking of the universal or the general amidst the particulars. It seeks unity in the diversity.

Saṅgraha naya is the synthetic point of view which seeks to find unity in diversity. Every object is the synthesis of many qualities, the generality and the particularity. *Saṅgraha naya* seeks

11. *Tattvārtha Bhāṣya*: 1, 35.

to establish the common points between objects and to bring them together as belonging to one category. The Vedānta and Sāṅkhya darsanas look at reality from the synthetic point of view. *Saṅgraha naya* seeks to find reality as one without distinction.¹²

Saṅgraha naya is of two types: *Parasaṅgraha* and *Apara-saṅgraha*. The first aims at finding out unity which is of the metaphysical nature. The second seeks to find unity and generality in the empirical world, as for example, we seek the general concept of cowness in the individual cows.

(3) *Vyavahāra naya* is the practical point of view; it is the analytic point of view. It is to be considered as the empirical approach to the problems of grasping the objects in the phenomenal world. The *Vyavahāra naya*, therefore, comprehends reality from the practical and the common-sense point of view. *Vyavahāra naya* is of two types: (1) *Sāmānya Bhedaka*, wherein we are concerned with presenting the general nature of the object; (2) *Vīśeṣa Bhedaka* which analyses a special nature of a thing in its various distinctions. *Naigama*, *Saṅgraha* and *Vyavahāra nayas* are *dravyārthika naya*.

(4) *Rjusūtra naya* is restricted to the understanding of the modes and the states of the momentary present and not as a continuum. It looks at the object as modification of the momentary present.¹³ The past modifications are destroyed; the future modifications are yet to come. What we can get to know is the momentary present. According to the *Rjusūtra naya* reality of the object cannot be established because it is only a state. *Rjusūtra naya* is the point of view adopted by the Buddhist philosophers. It is of two types; (1) *Sūkṣma Rjusūtra* and (2) *Sthūla Rjusūtra*. The *Sūkṣma Rjusūtra naya* comprehends the state of the object at a particular moment only; but *Sthūla Rjusūtra naya* looks at the state of the object as it is presented in the series of moments.

(5) *Sabda naya* has a reference to the word and its meaning. It analyses the meaning of the word in the context of the agent,

12. *Anuyoga dvāra*: Sanghahiyapiṇḍiatthām, sangahavayaṇam samāsaō binti,

13. *Ibid.* Paccupannaggabī ujjusuō ḡayavibhī muṇeavvō I

gender, number and the prefixes that are prefixed to the word. For instance, a word in a masculine gender has different meaning from the same word in the feminine gender. Similarly the prefixes like “ā, vi, pra, and sam”, to the word *hāra* have different meanings with different connotations. *Āhāra*, *Vihāra*, *Prahāra* and *Samhāra* connote different meanings.

(6) *Samabhirūḍha naya* is the application of the *Sabda naya*. It has reference to the etymological meaning. For example, the words *Rāja* and *Nṛpa* may refer to the same person but the first means one who shines and the second means one who rules. Indra has been called by different names like *Śakra* and *Purandara*. These connote different meanings. In this way, *samabhirūḍha naya* refers to the distinctions in the meanings of the words with reference to its root meaning and modifications.

(7) *Evaṁbhūta naya* not only sees the difference between words with their etymological meanings, but it also sees the difference between one and the same word with its distinctions with reference to the present context of its function. For instance, a priest (*Pūjāri*) would be called a priest and the name priest would be relevant to him actually at the time of worshiping the deity.

The Cambridge philosophers and the Analytic school of philosophy in the present day are very much concerned with the exclusive application of the *Sabda naya* in its various forms.

So far, we have presented, in brief, the logical implications of the concept of *naya* restricting the discussion to the earlier views as mentioned in the classical texts in Prākrit. The metaphysical implication of the concept of *nayas* is equally important. From the metaphysical point of view *naya* can be distinguished into two forms: (1) *Niscaya naya* and (2) *Vyavahāra naya*. *Niscaya naya* is the ultimate noumenal point of view, while *Vyavahāra naya* is the practical phenomenal point of view.¹⁴ *Niscaya naya* grasps reality in its ultimate aspect, while *Vyavahāra*

14. *Samayasāra* 11: “*Vavahārō bhuyatthō desidō du suddhapaō*”

naya is practical in its approach. It attempts to understand the phenomenal nature of reality.

In the Jaina Āgamic literature there is the distinction between *Niscaya* and *Vyavahāra naya* whose functions are to look at reality from the noumenal and phenomenal points of view. The Buddhist mentions the "Paramārtha and Samvṛta" points of view. The Upaniṣads mention the *Sthūla* and *Sūkṣma drṣṭi*. Jainas look at reality from the *Niscaya naya* in order find out the real nature of the object with reference to its substance and not so much with reference to its modes, although the consideration of the modes is secondary.

Ācārya Kundakunda has given prominence to the distinctions between *Niscaya naya* and *Vyavahāra naya*. They are both complementary to each other; both are necessary for the full understanding of the nature of reality.¹⁵ He has given elaborate interpretation of the application of the concept of *naya* to the various problems of logic and philosophy. Kundakunda's emphasis on the distinction between *Niscaya* and *Vyavahāra naya* is his special contribution. This distinction has a psychological content. The approach to the understanding of the nature of things depends on the capacity of the individual to grasp the nature of the thing. In the *Samayasāra*¹⁶ Kundakunda explains that it is necessary to present the nature of reality to different individuals from different angles according to the capacity of the individuals to understand the nature of things. For some it would be sufficient to present abstract principles. But for others whose ability is less, it would be necessary to explain in allegoric and pictorial language. For the common man the metaphysical principles have to be explained in empirical terms.

Kundakunda has thus presented the distinction between the metaphysical and practical approaches to the problems of philosophy. He has interpreted the concepts of *Jiva*, *Samyaktva* *Upayoga* and the concepts of theory of knowledge from the

15. *Ibid.*

16. *Ibid.*

Niscaya and *Vyavahāra naya*. For instance, while analysing the distinction of the concept of *naya* from the practical and the noumenal points of view, he mentions that *Subha* and *Asubha Upayoga* are concerned with presenting the problems of the worldly conduct, while *Suddha Upayoga* is the characteristic of the pure and perfect soul.¹⁷

(b) *Syādvāda* is the logical expression of the *Nayavāda*. The various points of view from which reality is looked at gives the possibility of a comprehensive view of reality which can be expressed in propositional forms. The seven fundamental propositional forms have been mentioned. Therefore, it is also called *saptabhaṅgi*. Some have raised a controversy regarding the content of the *syādvāda* and the identity of the concept of *syādvāda* and *saptabhaṅgi*.

It is difficult to decide whether *nayavāda* or *syādvāda* was earlier. It appears that *nayavāda* seems to be earlier because Umāsvāti, in his *Tattvārthasūtra* describes the kinds of *nayas* but makes no mention of *syādvāda* and seven-fold predication.¹⁸

In the early Jaina canonical literature there are only a few passages in which references to *syādvāda* have been made. They occur in the *bhagavatī sūtra*; it is expressed in the form of three predication. Among the other early references Bhadrabhu's *Sūtrakṛtāṅga Niryukti* is prominent. The developed form of the doctrine in the form of the seven-fold propositions is well described in *Pancāstikāyasāra* of Kundakundācārya and *Āptamimāṃsā* of Samantabhadra. Later logicians have given systematic exposition of the poctrine.

Syādvāda is based on three fundamental predication: (1) Affirmation (*asti*), (2) Negation (*nāsti*), (3) Indescribable (*avaktavyam*). These three predication have been developed into the seven predication with their possible permutations. In the *Syādvāda* the word "Syāt" has been very often interpreted as 'perhaps' connoting uncertainty or doubt. But it would be apter

17. *Ibid.*

18. Kalghatgi (T.G.), *Jaina View of Life* (Jivaraja Granthamala 20, pp. 21).

to interpret the word *Syāt* as 'in a particular context', from a particular point of view, in a universe of discourse. The *Syādvāda* has been generally expressed in the seven-fold predication: (1) Affirmation (*asti*), (2) Negation (*nāsti*), (3) Affirmation and Negation (*asti-nāsti*), (4) Indescribable (*avaktavyam*), (5) Affirmation and indescribability (*asti-avaktavyam*), (6) Negation and indescribability (*nāsti-avaktavyam*) and (7) Affirmation-Negation and indescribability (*asti-nāsti-avaktavyam*). These seven-fold predications constitute the elements of *syādvāda* and they can be considered as *saptabhaṅgi*.

It is neither necessary nor possible, in this analysis, to study the exhaustive presentation and interpretation of the seven-fold predications. Suffice it to say, that the *Saptabhaṅgi* is logical prius of the metaphysical interpretation of the concepts used in the empirical sciences as well as in philosophical literature. *Syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgi* presents a methodology of predication which is meant for giving a comprehensive picture of reality. Modern science has realised that the methodology of *syādvāda* is very useful for the statistical investigations of probability, quantum physics and quantum mechanics. Dr. J. B. S. Haldane and Mahalanobis have emphasised the value of the Jaina theory of *syādvāda* for the methodological investigation in science.¹⁹ The synoptic presentation of reality by *syādvāda* gives a true picture of reality in all its aspects and that is the essence of Jaina outlook, which helps to remove the intellectual cobwebs arising out of *ekānta*. The *syādvāda* of the Jainas affirms that a thing is never destroyed; and that, which is not, never comes into being.²⁰ In this sense, the *syādvāda* presents the possibility of predicating different characteristics of the object from the points of view of substance which is permanent and the modes which are changing.²¹

19. *Samkhya*; Journal, 1958.

20. *Pancastikāyasāra*: 15. Bhāvassa patthi nāsō, patthi abhāvassa uppādō I
—*Vyavacchedikā*.

21. *Anuyogadvāra*: Ädipamavyomasamasvabhāvam,
syādvādamudrānati bhedi vastu I
Tannityamevaikamanyityamanya
diti syādajnadvīyatam pralāpah II

It would be desirable to consider some of the misconceptions regarding the validity of the theory of *saptabhaṅgi*. In the earlier portion of the Āgamas, roots of *saptabhaṅgi* have been briefly mentioned.²² Ācārya Kundakunda has mentioned some predication of *saptabhaṅgi* as Affirmation, Negation and affirmation-negation.²³ Later logicians have developed it in all its aspects. Some scholars have taken this as later development by logicians like Akalanka, Vidyānandi etc. It has also been maintained that Jaina logical thought had a comparatively late origin, and so the non-jaina thinkers had already asserted their position even before the Jaina thinkers came to the arena. The Jainas had a lot to learn and assimilate. This view refers specially to the distinction of the types of knowledge, although logical concepts were also considered to be of later origin by these scholars.²⁴

But this view need not be over-emphasised as an accepted dogma. We should recognise that the Jaina darśana was first presented by the *tīrthaṅkaras*. *Gaṇadharas* formulated and taught the same to the descpiles. It was later expressed in the form of elaborated theories.²⁵ This gradual presentation of the Jaina thought does not mean that the *tīrthaṅkaras* and the *Gaṇadharas* were not aware of the full implication and the methodology of expression of the doctrine of syādvāda. The *tīrthaṅkara* has been considered to be a “sarvadarśi” and it is not possible to say that he did not know the implications and the methodological formulations of the doctrine of syādvāda. It would be apter to say that the doctrine of *saptabhaṅgi* was only elucidated by the *Gaṇadharas* and the later philosophers elaborated the theory. It is possible that the *tīrthaṅkaras* presented their teachings in a way suitable to the intellectual climate of the audience and the later philosophers developed it.

22. “Jivāṇam bhante, kim sāsaya, asāsaya ?

Goyamā, jīvā siya sāsaya, siya asāsaya, davvāṭṭhayē sāsaya, bhāvāṭṭhayayē asāsaya I *Bhagavatī* : 7, 2, 773.

23. *Pancāstikāyasaṇa* : *Pravacanasāra* : Siya atthi patthi ubayam I

24. Tatin (Nathmal) : *Studies in Jaina philosophy*, (Banaras. 1951) pp. 29.

25. Bhadrababu : Attham Bhāsai arahā, suutam guṇothati niupam I

We get abundant evidence for the antiquity of syādvāda as presented in the Āgamas, in the dialogues between Mahāvīra and the disciples. Gautama Gaṇadhara asked several questions regarding the nature and the state of *Jīva* in various conditions. Similarly, questions were asked regarding the predication of the nature of molecules in different forms. Mahāvīra answered and said that :

1. A molecule with two space-units is Ātman from the point of self-nature of the Ātman.
2. From the point of view of the other nature of the Ātman, it is not ātman.
3. From the point of view of both the self and the other natures, it is indescribable.
4. From the point of view of the mode of existence of a molecule of one place unit (*ekadesī*) and of the mode of non-existence of the same, a molecule of two space points has a predication of affirmation and Negation.
5. From the point of view of the mode of existence of one place unit (*ekadesī*) and of non-existence of the other place unit, a molecule of two space points has the predication of affirmation and inexpressibility.
6. A molecule of one place unit, having the mode of non-existence, and of the other place unit having the modes of existence and non-existence, a molecule of two space points has the predication of Negation & inexpressibility.²⁶

In the same way, Mahāvīra explained the various predicational formulations with reference to a molecule with three place units, a molecule of four place units and so also of five and six place units. Molecule of five space units presents twenty-two proposi-

26. *Bhagavati Sataka* 12, 3010.

Also refer to Devendra Muni Shastri : *Jaina Darsana: our Vistara* (Hindi) pp. 255-262 for detailed analysis.

tional predication, and there are twenty three propositional forms in the case of molecule of six place units.²⁷

From the discussion given above it is clear that the seven-fold predicational scheme called *saptabhaṅgi* is not a later development presented by the Ācāryas. It is to be found in the Āgamic literature in all its implications. This methodological scheme was presented in the form of explanations to the questions asked by the *Ganadharas*. It was not presented as a theory of logic or epistemology. It was only later philosophers who elaborated the implications already present in the Āgamic literature. Pandit Dalsukh Malvania in his *Agama yug kā Jaina darsana* has given emphasis on this point of view.

In the seven predicational forms, affirmation, negation and inexpressibility are primary, others are derivative. In the *Bhagavatī sūtra* seven-fold predication are mentioned.²⁸ In the *Pancāstikāyasāra* Kundakundācārya has mentioned the seven-fold predication. The predication of *avaktavya* (inexpressibility) has been made the third predication in the *Bhagavatī sūtra* and in the *Viśeṣāvasyakabhaṇya*.²⁹ In the *Pancāstikāyasāra* the predication of *avaktavya* has been mentioned as the fourth predication. But in the *Pravacanasāra* it has the third place.³⁰ Later philosophers have used both methods.

We may now consider the epistemological distinctions in *saptabhaṅgi* as (1) *Pramāṇasaptabhaṅgi*, (2) *Nayasaptabhaṅgi*. *Pramāṇasaptabhaṅgi* can be interpreted as the dialectic of the seven-fold predication with reference to the valid source of

27. *Bhagavati* : 10, 10, 469.

28. Pandit Dalsukh Malvania: *Agama yugakā Jaina Darsana* (Hindi) pp. 112-113.

29. *Bhagavati Sūtra Sataka*: 12, 3010; ch. 10-20.

30. (a) *Pancāstikāyasāra*: gatha. 14.

30. (b) *Pravacanasāra*, *Jnēyadhikāra*: gatha 115.]

"atthi tti ya naṭthi tti ya havadi avattavvamidi punodavvam I
pajjayeṇadu keṣavi tadubhayamādiṭṭamapam VI" II

knowledge (*Pramāṇa*). It is comprehensive and it embraces all aspects of the apprehension of the object. It is called *sakalādesa* (complete presentation). But a predication from a particular point of view (*naya*) is a partial presentation, because it does not give a comprehensive picture of the reality in all its aspects. Therefore, it is *Vikalādesi*. It is the apprehension of an object from the particular point of view. It is also called *naya saptabhangi*. The seven-fold predication (*saptabhangi*) is comprehensive and *sakalādesi* with reference to the *Pramāṇa* because the *pramāṇa* is a valid source of knowledge which is presented not from a particular point of view but from all angles. And the predication is called *pramāṇavākyā*. The partial presentation from particular point of *naya* is called *nayavākyā*.

The comprehensive predication with reference to the *pramāṇa* has its basis on the various considerations of the aspects of the object like (1) *ātmarūpa* (nature of the object), (2) *artha* (its existence), (3) *kāla* (time), (4) *sambandha* (relation of the attribute of existence with the object as inherence), (5) *upakāra* (the function of the object), (6) *gaṇideśa* (the relation between the object and attributes) and (7) *saṃsarga* (the relation between attributes and the other attributes not known through the senses), (8) *śabda*: The existence is predicated of the word ('is'). Similarly the other inherent attributes of the objects are predicated of the word "is". The object like the pot (*ghata*) exists, is black, is hard etc., The word "is" is a copula which connects the object with its attributes. This analysis with its logical implications appears to be a later development.

Naya saptabhangi gives prominence to the modes of a thing. The predication form in the case of *naya saptabhangi* have also to be made with reference to (1) *kala*, (2) *ātmarūpa*, (3) *artha*, (4) *sambandha*, (5) *upakāra*, (6) *gaṇideśa*, (7) *samsarga*, (8) *śabda*. Every object is a synthesis of attributes and their modes. The relation between the attributes and modes is one of synthesis of non difference and difference. When we are studying the object from the different aspects of *Pramāṇa*, we look at the object in the comprehensive way. But when we study the same object from

the point of view of differentiation, the differentiation becomes primary and the synthesis is secondary. Later logicians have gone into minute discussions about the problem. The subtle implications of the doctrine is beyond the scope of our study.

The doctrine of *syādvāda* has had its critics as well as its votaries. If we survey the study of *syādvāda* from different points of view we find that there have been criticisms by eminent philosophers right from the time of Sankara and Rāmanuja. It has also been suggested that *syādvāda* is inconsistent with the Jaina philosophy. We need not go into these criticisms. Nor is it necessary for us to present the defence of *syādvāda* at this juncture. For centuries, philosophical thought in India and in the West was faced with conflicting theories resulting in scepticism of the Sophists in the Greeks and the Cārvāka and Ajnānavādins in India. The intellectual confusion due to the conflicting theories was difficult to be reconciled. Protagoras escaped the problems and said "Homomensure". The Sophists left the wise to wrangle with them and the quarrel of the universe let be.

But the Jainas did not accept such an escapist attitude. They faced facts squarely and tried to find out the truth implied in the various theories. This is the spirit of Anekānta and *Syādvāda*. It is intellectual non-violence.

Nikṣepa :

Man uses language. Language has numerous words. It is necessary to determine the exact meaning of the word with reference to the context and in a particular universe of discourse. *Nikṣepa* plays an important part in the determination of the exact meaning of that word.³¹

The function of *Nikṣepa* is to understand the exact content of the words in terms of meaning and its usage. The essence of *Nikṣepa* is to study the implications of the meanings of the words in their definiteness and to find out that implication. The function

31. Dhavalī ṣaṭkhaṇḍagama 1, 10.

"Nicchaē niṇṇaē khivadi tti nikkāō".

of *Nikṣepa* is to define words with reference to their content of the meaning and the usage. The other sense in which the *Nikṣepa* is used is “*Nyāsa*”. It refers to implication and clarification. In the *Anuyogadvāra* it is stated that the main function of *Nikṣepa* is to clear the meaning of the word and to give the exact meaning. This is the use of *Nikṣepa* also.³² *Nikṣepa* removes ambiguities and uncertainties in the meaning of the word.

Nikṣepa can be distinguished from *pramāṇa* and *naya* with reference to its linguistic function. *Pramāṇa* and *naya* are primarily logical and epistemological. The function of *pramāṇa* is to comprehend the full nature of the object in all its aspects. *Naya* apprehends the nature of the object from a particular point of view and not in all aspects, but partially. But *Nikṣepa* is more concerned with the linguistic analysis of the function and their meanings. *Sabda naya*, *Samabhirūḍha naya* and *Evambhuta naya* are primarily the points of view of looking at an object. They are not very much concerned with the linguistic function of the work. But in the *Nikṣepa* we consider the function of the word with reference to its meaning and implication. We have to consider two types of the meaning of the word: (1) Primary meaning and (2) the secondary meaning. To make a distinction between primary meaning and the secondary meaning is the important function of *Nikṣepa*.

The basis of *Nikṣepa* can be analysed into four aspects: (1) *Pradhāna* (Primary), (2) *Apradhāna* (Secondary), (3) *Kalpita* (Imagined) and (4) *Akalpita* (Unimagined). *Bhāva* is unimagined *drṣṭi*. It is therefore primary. The other four *Nikṣepas* are more concerned with mental construction. Therefore they are not primary.

We may also consider the distinction in the *Nikṣepa* which can be analysed into four parts. (1) *Nāmanikṣepa* (2) *Sthāpanā Nikṣepa* (3) *Dravya Nikṣepa* and (4) *Bhāva Nikṣepa*. *Nāmannikṣepa*

32. *Anuyogadvāra vṛtti*:

“*Āvaśyakādi sabdānāmarthō nirupaṇiyāḥ, sa ca nikṣepa pūrvaka eva spaṣṭatā�a nirūpita bhavati*”.

refers to the proper name. A proper name is non-connotative. It is an arbitrary symbol for recognising an object. For instance, we call a very poor man as Laxmipati. *Sthāpanā-Nikṣepa* refers to the meaning of the word, although meaning may not be identical, with the word. In this, we take a word and identify the meaning of the word with one object. *Sthāpanānikṣepa* is of two types: (1) *Tadākāra* and (2) *Atadākāra* of different forms. For example, to identify the picture of Devadatta as Devadatta is called *tadākāra Sthāpanānikṣepa*. But if the picture of the animal like the elephant is knitted on a canvas in a small size it is called *Atadākāra Sthāpanānikṣepa*. *Dravya Nikṣepa* is not primarily mental as it is not concerned with the intention or the idea of the person using the word. It presents the exact meaning of the object with reference to the present tense. For example, we use the description of an object in the present context of the state, although it may refer to the past state. Similarly, the future state may also be expressed with reference to the present state. A pot (*ghaṭa*) which contained ghee in the past or if it is meant to contain ghee in future we call it a ghee pot. The scope of the *Dravyanikṣepa* is very vast and it may be expressed in different forms.

Bhāva Nikṣepa refers to the grasping of the meaning of the nature of the object through the word. A learned man who is a teacher and who is useful as a teacher may be called a teacher. This is *Āgamabhāva Nikṣepa*. A teacher who is actually engaged in teaching may be considered to be a teacher in activity from the point of view of *No-Āgamabhāva Nikṣepa*. In these cases a word has no reference to the aspect of the function in partial form. It has three forms like *Loukika*, *Kupravacanika* and *Lokottara*. These distinctions have been worked out and elaborated by later logicians.

In the *Dravyanikṣepa* there is implication of the absence of the cognitive function. But in the *Bhāva nikṣepa* there is partial absence of the cognitive function. For example, a teacher makes some gestures by hand and turns over the pages. These activities are behavioural and do not refer to the conceptual content of

the activity. In the *bhāvanikṣepa* there is the expression of the present state and the mode of the object.

Every thing is expressed through *nikṣepa*. *Nikṣepa* plays an important part in the analysis of the function of language and the determination of the exact meaning of the words. The Āgamic seers were aware of the fact that knowledge would be meaningful if we use definite language. Language is an instrument of expressing thought and words convey meanings. If we have to present thoughts coherently we have to be careful in using the words in order to avoid ambiguity. In the Western thought, we find Socrates emphasising the fact that we must define terms. Modern philosophers have turned towards the analysis of words as vehicle of meaning.

The Āgamic literature has given importance to *nikṣepa* as a means to the understanding of the exact meaning of the word. *Pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa* are complementary to each other. *Pramāṇa* and *naya* are primarily epistemological, although logical implications have been discussed as overtones of epistemological problems. *Nikṣepa* is primarily linguistic in its approach.

4. The Jaina Theory of Knowledge

The Jainas have developed a systematic theory of knowledge which analyses the problems like the nature of knowledge, the relation of knowledge to the self and the types of knowledge. In the Āgamic literature we find there is a substantial contribution to the development of the theory of knowledge.

The Jainas have stated that *upayoga* is the essential characteristic of the soul. In the *Gommatasāra Jivakāṇḍa*, *upayoga* is described as the drive which leads to the apprehension of the object.³³ It is the source of the psychical aspect of experience. All the three aspects-cognitive, affective and conative spring from it. It is

33. *Gommatasāra Jivakāṇḍa*: Ch. XX, verse 672.

“vāthupittam bhāvō jādjhivassa jodu uvajogo”.

described as that by which the subject is grasped.³⁴ In my book *Some problems in Jaina Psychology*, I have interpreted *Upayaga* as karmic energy which is responsible for the flow of knowledge and intuition. *Jñāna* and *Darśana* spring from *Upayoga*.³⁵ The Āgamas make a clear distinction between *Jñāna* and *Darśana*. Kundakundācārya distinguishes between *Jñāna* and *Darśana* from the empirical and transcendental points of view. He says that Ātman, its knowledge (*Jñāna*) and intuition (*Darśana*)—all these are identical and they reveal the self and the non-self.³⁶ *Upayoga* has been distinguished as *Anākāra Upayoga* which is to be identified with *Darśana* and *Sākāra Upayoga* is to be identified with *Jñāna*.³⁷ Ācārya Virasena in his commentary called *Dhavalā* on *Śaṅkhanḍāgama* of Puṣpadanta says 'What comprehends an external object of the nature of the universal-cum-particular is *Jñāna*, and comprehension of the self of same nature is *darśana*'.³⁸ According to the Āgamas, the awareness of one's self which shows the striving for knowledge, and the subsequent determinate knowledge, is *Jñāna*. The self-same consciousness is called *darśana* as well as *Jñāna* when it is referred to the object of cognition.

Knowledge is inherent in the self. It is the essential characteristic of the self. Self cannot exist without *Jñāna*. But the relation need not be construed as the relation of substance and attribute in term of Nyāyavaśeṣika theory. From the practical point of view, however, we may distinguish between self and knowledge and say that self *has* knowledge. But from the noumenal point of view there is no distinction between knowledge and

34. *Prajna*, 27: *Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*.

35. *Prajnāpanā* 29-30: *Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*.

36. *Niyamasāra*: 170.

37. *Prajnāpanā* para 29-30.

Abhidhānarājendra Vol. II, pp. 700.

38. Ācārya Virasena: *Dhavalā* on *Śaṅkhanḍāgama*:

"Sāmānya viseṣātmaka bāhyartha grahaṇam jāñnam :
tadātmaka svarūpa grahaṇam darśanam iti siddham".

self.³⁹ Knowledge and self are intimately connected and we may say that from the noumenal point of view they are identical.

Knowledge is self-illuminative and it also illumines the object of knowledge (*svapara prakāśaka*). Cognition cognises itself and also illumines other objects, just as the lamp illumines the objects around it and illumines itself. In the Āgama literature the characteristics of knowledge have been presented from the points of view of identity and difference (*abheda* and *bheda*). From the point of view of identity the self and knowledge are identical. From the point of view of difference the self has a quality of knowledge. From the point of view of identity and difference the self can be said to be neither completely different nor completely identical. This is because knowledge is the quality of the self and also because the object of knowledge is related to the knowledge as of external relation.

The theory of knowledge in the Āgamas is very ancient. In the *Rājapraśniyasūtra*, Keśikumara explains to Śramaṇa Rājapradeśi, the theory of knowledge as presented in the Āgamas. Keśikumāra belongs to the Pārvanātha tradition. Keśikumāra explains the classification of knowledge into five types according to the Pārvanātha tradition :

1. *abhinibhokikajñāna* (sense experience.)
2. *Śrutajñāna* (indirect knowledge.)
3. *avadhijñāna* (clairvoyance.)
4. *manahparyāyajñāna* (telepathy.)
5. *kevalajñāna* (omniscience.)⁴⁰

39. *Ācārāṅga Sūtra* : 5, 5, 166

- (a) je āyā se vinnāya, je se sýa
- (b) Samayasāra gāthā 7
- (c) Bhagavati 12, 10 nāne puṇa niyamam sýa I

40. *Rāyapraśniya-sūtra* : 165.

“Evam khu paesi I amhā samāṇāpam pacavihe nāne paṇṇatte I
Tam jahā-abhiṇibodhiyāpāne, suyanāne, ohīṣpāne,
maṇapajjayaṇpāne kevalaṇpāne I

Also refer to *Bhagavati* : 88, 2, 317.

In the *Uttarādhyayana sūtra* there is a dialogue between Kesikumāra and Gautama.⁴¹ From this it is clear that there was no difference between the Pārśva and Mahāvīra traditions regarding the nature and the types of knowledge. Similarly the Digambara and Śvetāmbara traditions accept the distinction of five types of knowledge, although there seems to be some difference of opinion regarding the nature of Kevalajñāna.

From the point of view of the development of the theory of knowledge and on the basis of the Āgamic theory of knowledge, we can distinguish three different stand-points regarding the nature and types of knowledge.⁴² The first stand-point accepts the Āgamic classification of five types of knowledge. It also accepts the distinction of the four stages in the *abhinibhodakajñāna* like, (1) *avagṛha*, (2) *ihā*, (3) *avāya* and (4) *dhāraṇa*.⁴³ The second stand point makes a distinction in knowledge into—(1) *Pratyakṣa* (direct), (2) *Parokṣa* (indirect) with its sub-division. In this traditional sense knowledge is not direct, because sense organs are impediments to the direct cognition by the self. The soul is obstructed from getting direct cognition in this type of experience. Knowledge that soul gets directly without the help of the sense organs is direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*). *Sthānāṅga* clearly makes these distinctions.⁴⁴

The third stand-point has brought about a slight modification in the classification of knowledge. This classification distinguishes *matijñāna* (sense experience) into two types as *pratyakṣa* (direct) due to sense organs and *parokṣa* (indirect) due to the mind. This tradition takes into consideration the views of other Indian philosophers. With a view to avoiding ambiguity and confusion, they have designated the sense experience (*matijñāna*) also as *pratyakṣa*. There are two types of *pratyakṣa*: (1) *Samyavahārika pratyakṣa*. It is *matijñāna* or sense experience. (2) *Nija pratyakṣa* which the

41. *Uttarādhyayana*: 23.

42. Pandit Dalsukh Malvania: *Āgama Yugakā Jaina Darśana* (Hindi) pp. 129.

43. *Bhagavatī*: 88, 317.

44. *Sthānāṅga*: 71.

self gets without the help of the sense-organs. The forms of this *pratyakṣa* are *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*. From the point of view of the purity and certainty of knowledge there is a graduated excellence from the *matijñāna* to *kevalajñāna*. Knowledge obtained through mind only is *parokṣajñāna*. These stages of the knowledge have been scientifically analysed by later Ācāryas. The mental states like memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) have been defined with reference to the metaphysical implications. But such an analysis of the mental states like *smarana* and *pratyabhijñā* in metaphysical overtones need not be adequate explanations about the nature of these mental states. In the Āgamic literature there was not much of logical and metaphysical disputation about these problems. But later logicians had to compete with other scholars belonging to different *darśanas*. Therefore, they effected modifications in the classifications of knowledge. We may now consider, in brief, primarily with reference to the early Āgamic literature the nature of the five types of knowledge. However, casual references to later writers in Sanskrit may have to be made for the sake of clarification and with a view to understanding the development of the epistemological concepts.

(1) *Matijñāna* (sense experience) is arrived at with the help of sense organs and the mind. In the Āgamic literature it has been called *abhinibhodikajñāna*.⁴⁵ *Viśeṣāvasyakabhaṣya* mentions the equivalent terms for *matijñāna*: *ihā*, *apoha vimarṣa*, *mārgaṇa*, *gavesaṇa*, *saṃjñā*, *smṛti*, *mati*, *prajñā* etc.⁴⁶ *Nandi sūtra*⁴⁷ also mentions equivalent words for *matijñāna*. *Matijñāna* may be referred to as knowledge arrived at through the operations of the sense organs and the mind. Mind is a quasi-sense organ. Without

45. (a) *Uttarādhyayana*: 28, 4.

“Tattha pancavīham nāṇam suyam abhiṇobohiyam I
Obināṇam tu taiyam maṇanāṇam ca kevalam II

(b) *Nandi sūtra* (Ed. Punyavijayaji) pp. 25.

46. *Viśeṣāvasyaka-Bhāṣya*: 396.

47. *Nandi sūtra*: (Punyavijayaji Ed.) 77. pp. 27.

“Ihā apoha vimāṇa maggaṇa ya gavesaṇa I
Sappā sati mati pappa savvam abiṇobohiyam” II

the help of the mind it would not be possible to get the full knowledge of an object.

Sense experience is possible, as we said earlier, with the help of sense organs and the mind. The sense organs receive stimulations and mind organises the stimulations. These two are physiological and psychic conditions of perceptions. But that is not sufficient. We have also to remove some psychic impediments which affect the nature of perception. These impediments are the knowledge and sense obscuring karma. Through the destruction of the knowledge obscuring karma, we can get perception.⁴⁸ This is the psychic condition, wherein by removing the psychic impediments a mental set is prepared which is necessary for perceptual experience.

According to the Jainas sense perception can be analysed into four stages: (1) *avagṛha*, (2) *ihā*, (3) *avāya* and (4) *dhārana*. In the *Nandi sūtra*, we get the analysis of the four stages.⁴⁹ *Avagṛha* is the first stage of sense experience. It is analogous to sensation. In the *Āvāsyaka Niruykti*, *avagṛha* has been defined as awareness of the sense data.⁵⁰ Jinabhadra describes *avagṛha* as indeterminate perception and *avāya* is the higher stage. It is more appropriate to say that *avagṛha* is mere awareness, mere cognition of the object without the knowledge of the specific nature of the object nor of its name.⁵¹ *Nandisūtra* makes a distinction of the two levels of *avagṛha* as *Vyanjanāvagṛha* and *arthāvagṛha*. *Vyanjanāvagṛha* is the earlier stage in which there is physiological stimulus condition of the sensation, of the immediate experience. *Nandisūtra* gives the example of *Mallakādrṣṭānta*.⁵² *Vyanjanāvagṛha* is, therefore, the stage of first awareness, the threshold of awareness. It is the physiological stimulus condition of awareness and it gradually gives the sensa-

48. *Samayasūtra*: 376-382.

49. *Nandi-sūtra*: 26.

50. *Āvāsyaka Niruykti*: 3.

51. *Viseṣāvāsyaka-bhāṣya*: 25, 5, 6.

52. *Nandi-sūtra*: *Mallaka drṣṭānta*.

tion, and that is the *arthāvagraha*. *Arthāvagraha* is the stage of sensation where there is experience of "that" but still we do not know what it is. In the *Viseśāvasyakabhāṣya* there is the discussion regarding the nature of *arthāvagraha*.⁵³ In the *Nandi sūtra* there is a statement that in this stage we are aware of the sound or colour but we do not cognise the nature of the sound or colour.⁵⁴ On the basis of such a distinction of the two stages of *avagraha* it is said that *vyanjanāvagraha* lasts for indefinite moments gradually proceeding towards the level of consciousness.⁵⁵

Ihā is striving for determinate and specific cognition. It is a tendency towards cognising the specific feature of the object. *Ihā* has been translated as 'speculation'. But it would be more appropriate to use the phrase 'associative integration'.⁵⁶ Cognition of objects in empirical experience is not complete with mere awareness at the sensational stage. In fact, pure sensations are not possible. *Ihā* introduces integrative process with the help of mental activity. It is striving of the mind towards coherence and integration of the sense impression. Thus *ihā* is a stage in the formation of perceptual experience.

Next comes the stage of *avāyā*. From the associative integration (*ihā*), we come to the stage of interpretation. In this stage the sensations are interpreted and meaning assigned to the sensation. That would be perception. *Nandisūtra* gives the following synonyms for *avāya*: *āvartanatā*, *Pratyāvartanatā*, *buddhi* and *vijñāna*.⁵⁷ Some Jaina logicians say that *avāya* has only a negative function. In this stage of experience there is merely the exclusion of non-existing quality. Now we need the cohering and retaining factors. That is provided by *dhāraṇa*. *Nandisūtra* defines *dhāraṇa* as the act of retaining the perceptual judgement (*avāya*) for a

53. *Viseśāvasyaka-bhāṣya* : 253.

54. *Nandisūtra* : 35.

55. *Nandisūtra* : 35.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Nandisūtra* : 32.

number of instants or innumerable instants.⁵⁸ *Nandisūtra*⁵⁹ gives *Sthāpana* and *pratisṭhā* as synonyms of *dhārapā*. *Dhārapā* has been described with reference to two functions, the negative and the positive function. Negative function implies retention as a factor of the absence of forgetting. It is retaining the impression received from sense organs. The positive function consists of the stage for recollection. Retention is the basis for recollection. This analysis of *dhārapā* as retention and condition of recollection has been worked out in greater detail with reference to the psychological analysis by later Jaina scholars like Umāsvāti, Akalanka, Hemacandra and Vādideva. This analysis is a later development with reference to the logical and psychological analysis presented by other scholars in the Vedic tradition. In this sense, it would be apt to say that Jaina Logic and epistemology are later developments as a consequence of its interaction between the different schools of Indian Philosophy. We need not refer to the discussion of the later philosophers, as the scope of this paper is restricted to the study of the development of Jainism as presented in the original Prākrit sources.

However, the analysis of the perceptual experience shows that the concrete psychosis involves four factors: (1) Reception of stimulation as expressed in the sensational stage, (2) Associative integration of the stimulations as we find in *ihā*, (3) Perceptual judgement which is yet unverbalised, (4) Retension of the impressions received and organised so far as expressed in *dhārapā*. *Dhārapā* is a condition of recollection also:

(d) Other sources of knowledge implied in the *śrutajñāna* are not discussed here in detail because most of the discussion would refer to the later developments in epistemology. However, the sources of knowledge like *smṛti* and *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) have been recognised as valid sources of knowledge. *Anumāna* (inference) has been recognised as a valid source of knowledge. Among the Jaina logicians, Bhadrabahu seems to be in favour of

58. *Nandisūtra*: 35.

59. *Ibid.*

ten membered syllogisms. The *Āvāsyaka Nirvukti* describes the ten propositions constituting a syllogism. Later development in the logic of inference based on the discussion of the *Neonyāya* pattern of Yaśovijaya need not concern us here.

(e) Now we come to the study of the direct experience as *pratyakṣa jñāna* mentioned by the Jainas. This is *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* which we may call as para-normal experience and in the case of highest experience, it is super-normal experience. In the case of the *nijapratyakṣa* the self gets this experience without the sense organs. It gets the experience directly when the veil of karma obscuring knowledge is removed. This is called *pratyakṣa*. It is of two kinds. (1) *Vikala* which is imperfect and incomplete and (2) *Sakala* which is complete and perfect. *Vikala* is divided into two types: (1) *Avadhi* (Clairvoyance) and (2) *Manahparyāya* (telepathy). Perfect transcendental perception is omniscience. It is *caval*. This is the stage of super-normal perception. It should be necessary to analyse the three forms of *pratyakṣa* that we have just mentioned: (1) *Avadhi*, (2) *Manahparyāya* and (3) *Kevala*.

Avadhi is a form of direct perception. It is para-normal and it may be compared to the clairvoyant cognition. In this we get perception of the object without the help of sense organ and we apprehend objects which are beyond the reach of the sense organ. However, in *avadhi* we perceive only such things as have form and shape.⁶⁰ This can be compared, as we said earlier, with clairvoyance, which modern psychical research calls a form of extra-sensory perception. Things without form, like the soul and dharma, cannot be perceived by *avadhi*. Clairvoyance of this type differs with different individuals according to their capacity developed by them through their merit. The highest type of *avadhi* can perceive all objects having form. Regarding the capacity of perceiving objects in *avadhi* in terms of time the lowest type of *avadhi* can last only a short time, a second. It cannot be extended beyond a second. Similarly, it cannot know

60. *Āvāsyaka-nirvukti* 45; *Nandisūtra*: 46.

all the modes of objects. It can cognise only a part of the modes.⁶¹

The Jainas have given a detailed analysis of *avadhi* and of beings who possess *avadhi*. Heavenly beings and beings in hell possess *avadhi* naturally. Similarly some lower animals possess *avadhi* by birth. This is called *bhavapratyaya*. In the case of heavenly beings and beings in hell, *bhavapratyaya avadhi* is possible because they do not possess bodily sense organs like human beings.⁶² In the case of human beings as well as five sensed lower organisms, *avadhi* is possible due to the destruction and subsidence of the relevant veil of karma.⁶³ Thus, human beings and some lower organisms have to acquire *avadhi* due to merit. This is called *gunapratyaya*⁶⁴ *Viseṣāvasyakabhāṣya* gives a detailed description of *avadhi* from fourteen points of view and its varieties with reference to spatial and temporal extension.⁶⁵ *Pancāstikāyasāra* divides *avadhi* into three types with reference to spatial extension: *Desāvadhi*, *Paramāvadhi* and *Sarvāvadhi*. All the three are conditioned by psychic quality but *Desāvadhi* is also conditioned by birth in the case of heavenly beings and beings in hell. *Desavādhi* is divided into two types: *Gunapratyaya* and *bhavapratyaya* with their subdivisions.⁶⁶ *Nandisūtra* gives six varieties of *avadhi* which are possible in the case of homeless ascetics. The table of classifications of *avadhi* (clairvoyance) according to the *Nandisūtra* is given separately. (See page 32).

Modern psychical research has recognised the possibility of the possession of extra-sensory perception like that of *avadhi* in some individuals. The psychic phenomenon called 'French sensitiveness', sometimes called as 'psychometry', may be included as a form of *avadhi*, although the mind and the sense organs do

61. *Nandisūtra*: 16.
62. *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*: 71; *Nandisūtra*: 7.
63. *Sthānāṅga-sūtra*: 7; *Nandisūtra*: 8.
64. *Viseṣāvasyaka-bhāṣya*: 572; *Nandisūtra*: 63.
65. *Viseṣāvasyaka-bhāṣya*: 569.
66. *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 44; and its commentary.

play their part. Modern Psychical research has accepted the fact of clairvoyant cognition. Eminent philosophers like Sidgwick, Price and C. D. Broad, have admitted the existence of such clairvoyant experiences.

Manahparyāya is the next form of supernormal perception. The Jaina conception of *Manahparyāya* is based on their doctrine of mind. Mind, according to the Jainas, is a particular material substance composed of a specific form of *vargapās* or group of atoms. It is composed of an infinite number of atoms called *manovargapās*. The finer atoms form the karma. Next in fineness come the *manovargapās*. In the *Manahparyāya*, telepathic experience, there is the interaction on mental states; mental states coming into contact with other mental states without the normal channel of communication. It is mind-contact between different individuals. *Manahparyāya* cognises mental states of others without the instrumentality of the sense organs.⁶⁷ *Manahparyāya* cognition is possible if only there is physical and mental discipline. Therefore *Āvaśyaka Niryukti* mentions that only human beings of character specially the ascetics can acquire *manahparyāya*.⁶⁸ In the *Nandisūtra* there is description of the possibility of *Manahparyāya* for human beings with physical and mental discipline.⁶⁹ The conditions of the possession of the *Manahparyāya* can be mentioned as (1) developed human beings in the *Karma bhūmi*, (2) with *samyakdrṣṭi* and (3) with self-control and righteousness.

Sthānāṅga recognises two types of *manahparyāya*: (1) *Rjumati* and (2) *Vipulamati*.⁷⁰ *Rjumati* is less pure and it sometimes falters. *Vipulamati* is pure and more lasting. *Pancāstikāyasāra* gives a description of the distinction between the nature of *Rjumati* and *Vipulamati manahparyāya*.⁷¹

67. *Viseśāvaśyaka-bhāṣya*: 669 and 814.

68. *Āvaśyaka-niryukti*: 76.

69. *Nandisūtra*: 39-44.

70. *Sthānāṅga*: 72.

71. *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 45.

Rjumati gives direct intuition of the thoughts of others, while in the *Vipulamati* the process of knowing the idea of others is manifested in an irregular way. One who is on the higher stage of spiritual development acquires *Vipulamati manahparyāya*, while one who is in the lower scale of spiritual development gets *Rjumati manahparyāya*.

In the West, interest in the study of extra-sensory perception is increasing. The Society for Psychical Research is investigating the phenomena of extra-sensory perception. Prof. Oliver Lodge carried out experiments on telepathy when he was a Professor of Physics. Duke University is foremost in the investigations of the phenomena of extra-sensory perception. Some Psychologists, like McDougall, were inclined to accept the fact of telepathy. Prof. H. H. Price is of the opinion that there is abundant evidence for accepting the telepathic intuition.⁷² Dr. Rhine maintains that extra-sensory perception in the form clairvoyance and telepathy are actual and demonstrable occurrences. They are not sensory phenomena.⁷³

Kevala is omniscience. The soul in its pure form acquires this knowledge due to the removal of Karma. Perfect knowledge (omniscience) is gained by the destruction of the four types of karma—*Jñānāvaraṇiya*, *darśanāvaraṇiya*, *mohaniya* and *antarāya karmas*. The total destruction of the *mohaniya karma* is followed by a short interval of the time called *muhūrta*, the other karmas obscuring *jñāna*, *darśana* and *antarāya karma* are destroyed. Then the soul attains omniscience. The moment the darkening karmic substances of the six leśyas are removed, ignorance disappears.⁷⁴

Omniscience intuited all substances with all their modes. Nothing remains unknown in omniscience. There is nothing to be known and nothing is unknown. It is the perfect manifestation of the pure and perfect soul. When the obstructive and

72. *Philosophy* : October, 1950.

73. Rhine. J. B.: *Extra-sensory perception*, pp. 222.

74. (a) *Sthānāṅga*: 226.


(b) *Pramāṇa-mimāṃsa* : 1, 1, 15.

obscuring veils of karma are removed the omniscience is co-existent with the supreme state of the absolute purity of the life monad.

Some distinctions have been made in the nature of omniscience as *kevala jñāna*. It is said that *kevala jñāna* is of two types: (1) *Bhavastha*, the omniscience of the liberated who still live in the world. For example, the omniscience of the *Tirthaṅkaras* is of this type. (2) *Siddha*. It refers to the omniscience of the liberated souls who no longer remain in this world. There are sub-divisions of the two as for example the *bhavastha* may be sub-divided into *sayogi* and *iyogi*. *Sayogi* refers to the omniscience of the *tirthaṅkara* while still preaching in this world. But when his body is cast off, his omniscience is *Iyogi kevalajñāna*. Similarly, the *siddhas* omniscience is of two types as *anantara* and *parampara* with their sub-divisions.⁷⁵

It is not possible to establish the possibility of omniscience on the basis of the methods of investigation which psychology and the empirical sciences follow. However, its logical possibility cannot be denied. Progressive realization of greater and subtler degrees of knowledge by the individual is accepted by some psychologists, especially since the introduction of Psychical Research for analysing the phenomena of extra-sensory perception. A consummation of this progressive realization would logically be pure knowledge and omniscience, a single all-embracing intuition.

THE TABLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF AVADHI ACCORDING TO NANDISUTRA



Avadhi jñāna has reference to four factors:

Jaina Metaphysics

We have so far covered the problems concerning Jaina Logic and Epistemology. We shall now consider the Jaina Metaphysics with reference to the metaphysical presentations to be found in the early canonical literature. The philosophical problems, like the fundamental source of the universe, the principle of category and the psychic and non-psychic elements of the universe are the *philosophia perennis* of Jainism. Jainism is a realistic philosophy. It is empiricist in outlook. It is analytic in its methodology. It looks at life and the universe from the point of view of rational analysis and then transcends the stages of reason to enter into the stage of intuition and direct experience. The metaphysical problems were discussed with relevance and importance to life. In the case of the Buddha fundamental metaphysical problems were not relevant for his enquiry, as you are primarily concerned with the ethical problems of life. The metaphysical problems were for him "avyākṛta."¹ But Mahāvira faced the problems of *philosophia perennis* in a realistic sense and attempted to give solutions to these problems.

Mahāvira was faced with the problem of the universe (*loka*) and the beyond (*aloka*) regarding its eternity or continuity. A disciple of Mahāvira called Ārya rōha asked him, "Bhagawan, is the *loka* first and then the *aloka*?" Mahāvira said that *loka* and *aloka* were both there and will continue to be there. They are beginning-less (*anādi*) and endless (*ananta*). They are eternal (*sāśvata*). There is nothing earlier and nothing later concerning them.²

1. *Majjhima Nikāya—Cūlamalukyasūtra*: 63.

2. *Bhagavati*: 1, 6.

We live in this world and the entire cosmos including our world may be called the *loka*. It is the stellar universe. Beyond this, is the vast unlimited. It is the *aloka*. It is the Beyond, infinite and indefinable. In the vast unlimited Beyond *aloka*, substances like *dharma*, *adharma*, *kāla* and *jīva* have no relevance. They have relevance in the universe which is limited. The limitation of the universe is also due to the fact that these principles of motion and rest (*dharma* and *adharma*) are operative. In the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* the *loka* is described as that which sustains *jīva* and *ajīva*.³ The distinction between *loka* and *aloka* is an eternal distinction and it was not made at any particular time. It is not also possible to divide the eternal and non-eternal on some one principle. The universe is bounded and limited while *aloka*, as we have seen is limitless. The *lokākāsa* (bounded space) has innumerable *pradeśas* while the limitless *aloka* has infinite *pradeśas*. In the *Bhagavati sūtra* there is a dialogue between Mahāvīra and Āryaskandhaka. Mahāvīra said that the universe is limited with reference to space and its extension. With reference to measurable space the universe occupies a limited portion of space. From the point of view of time (*kāla*) the universe is endless and eternal, because there is no point of time in which the universe does not exist. From the points of view of the essence (*bhāva*) and the modes (*pariyāya*) the universe is endless, because the modes of substance are endless.⁴ It is possible to consider this distinction of the limit and the limitless and the limited with reference to the essence, modes, space and time in the light of the modern developments in the researches in Physics and Mathematics. It would not be out of place if we suggest the possible study of this problem with reference to Einstein's theory of four dimensions and relativity.

In the *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* and the *Bhagavati sūtra* there is a description of the different regions of the universe like the *Urdhvaloka* (upper world), *Madhya Loka* (Middle universe) and the *Tiryak Loka* (nether world). The description is elaborate in

3. *Uttarādhyayana*: 36, 2.

4. *Bhagavati*: 2, 1, 90.

mentioning the measurements in terms of *raju* and the different heavens and hells in the upper and the lower world. The middle world is the *karma bhūmi* in which the human beings live and are engaged in activity. The cosmological details have been worked out in the *Uttarādhyayana* and the *Bhagavati sūtra*.⁵ It is not necessary to go into the details of the cosmology for the sake of presenting the philosophical concepts of the Jainas. Moreover, the cosmological investigations were primarily based on traditional approach and, I think, mythological considerations are beyond the scope of this work.

In the *Bhagavati Sūtra*, there is a discussion about the fundamental nature of the universe and the source of the universe. Mahāvira said that the basis of the universe could be presented in eight forms:

1. *Ākāśā* is the basis of the air.
2. The Sea is based in the air.
3. The Earth is in the Sea.
4. The moving and the non-moving being are on the Earth.
5. *Ajīva* is based on *Jīva*.
6. The *Jīva* involved in the wheel of life is dependent on Karma, and the encrustations of karma.
7. *Ajīva* is comprehended with the help of *jīva*.
8. *Jīva* comprehends the nature of karma and is covered by the karmic particles.⁶

We find similar discussion between Yājnavalkya and Gārgi regarding the nature of the universe. Yājnavalkya said that air comes from space, Space from *gandharva loka*, *Gandharva loka* from *Āditya loka* and so on ultimately it is traced to *Brahma loka*. Gārgi asked, "where does the *Brahma loka* come from?" Yājnavalkya said, "do not ask such questions."⁷

5. *Uttarādhyayana*: 36, 50; 36, 54.
6. *Bhagavati* : 2, 9, 90.
7. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* : 3, 6.1.

The primary elements of the universe are earth, water, air and space. On the basis of these elements the universe is founded. The fundamental substances of the universe are matter (*ajiva*) and life (*jiva*). They are inter-related and inter-dependent. Karma is the matrix of the empirical individual selves (*jivas*). Due to the influx of the karmic matter the *jivas* get involved in the wheel of life.

The Jainas face the problem of the creation of the universe. Their contention is that the universe is neither created nor destroyed. It is beginningless and endless. It is only the states of the origination, continuation and disintegration which are responsible for the formation of the universe and disintegration at regular intervals. Therefore, the Jainas presented a theory of the cycle of time of evolution (*utsarpini*), and involution (*avasarpini*). There is no need of the creator for the creation of the universe, nor is it necessary to have a destroyer for the disintegration of the universe. The cycle of formation and disintegration of the universe is due to the uniformity of the laws of nature. The cycle of human birth and re-birth is due to the accumulation of karmic matter owing to the activity of the soul. When karma is removed, souls enjoy the eternal bliss in the *Siddhasila*.*

We may now consider the fundamental metaphysical position of the Jainas. In surveying the field of Indian philosophy, Dr. Padmarajaiah mentions five types of philosophy considered from the point of view of the nature of reality. They are:

1. Philosophy of Being as we find in the Advaita of Śamkara.
2. Philosophy of Becoming as presented by the Buddhists.
3. Philosophy subordinating difference to identity as we find in the *Viśiṣṭādvaita*.
4. Philosophy subordinating identity to difference as is presented in the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Dvaita* of *Vedānta*.

5. Philosophy that co-ordinated both identity and difference as is presented in the Jaina theory of reality.

According to the Jainas identity and difference, the one and the many, the universal and the particular, and substance and its modifications are equally real and they are co-ordinated with each other. For instance, change is as much real as identity. Becoming and modes are as much real as being and substance. This is the basic attitude of the Jaina philosophy. In this "coherent" view of reality equal emphasis is given on the substance and its modes, identity and difference and universal and the particular.

From the metaphysical point of view, Jainism is pluralistic. Jainism mentions seven fundamental principles (*tattvas*).⁹ They are *jīva* (living being), *ajīva* (non-living substance), *āśrava* (influx of karma), *bandha* (bondage in this wheel of life), *saṃvara* (stoppage of the influx of karma), *nirjarā* (removal of the accumulated karma) and *mokṣa* (liberated state). This classification of the fundamental principles into seven principles is metaphysical with overtones of spiritual values. To these seven principles, *pāpa* (sin) and *pūṇya* (merit) have been added. The nine principles inclusive of the two constitute the *padārthas* and it gives a flavour of religious content with the introduction of *pāpa* and *pūṇya*. From the point of view of the analysis of the cosmos, *jīva* and *ajīva* have been classified into six substance (*dravyas*). They are (1) *jīva* (living substance), *ajīva* (non-living substance). *Ajīva* has its forms. (2) *pudgala* (matter). (3) *dharma* (principle of motion), (4) *adharma* (principle of rest) (5) *ākāśa* (space) and (6) *kāla* (time). These are the six *dravyas*. The *dravya* is the substance because it possesses the fundamental characteristic of existence (*astitva*) and substantiality (*dravyatva*). Excepting *kāla*, all other substance are called *astikāya* because they have the characteristic of *astitva* (existence) and *kāyatva* (dimensions). But *kāla* is not an *asti-kāya*, because it has no *kāyatva* (dimension), it is mono-dimensional: *Pancāstikāya* mentions the characteristics of *dravya* as substantiality and existence.¹⁰ Therefore, *dravya* is

9. *Pancāstikāyasāra* : 9.

10. *Pancāstikāyasāra* : 7-8.

real. It is characterised by the origination (*utpāda*), permanence (*dhrauvya*) and disintegration (*vyaya*). These are the modes of the substance.¹¹ The substance (*dravya*) can be considered from two points of view, i.e. from the point of view of substantiality and from the point of view of its modes. For example, gold as gold is substance, it is permanent. But it may be used for preparing bangles and ornaments. They are the modes of the gold. The modes are relatively permanent in the sense they may be changed. They have duration and have no absolute permanence.¹² Yet there is no difference between the substance and its qualities and modes. One cannot exist without the other. There is neither substance without modes nor modes without substance.¹³ The concept of *astikāya* is a significant contribution of the Jainas to the metaphysics of the world. In the *astikāya*, they do not include *kāla* because *kāla* is unidimensional and the points of time are always in the linear motion. Therefore, there is no *kāyatva* for time.

We may now consider the seven principles in their metaphysical content. The universe is constituted of the two fundamental substances of *jīva* and *ajīva*.¹⁴ *Jīva* is active and as a characteristic of *upayoga* (karmic energy). It comes into contact with the *ajīva*, the non-living substance. Due to this contact of the *jīva* with the *ajīva*, there is activity. And this activity in the empirical world brings the *jīva* in contact with the karmic particles get encrusted with the soul, thereby bringing the soul to come in contact with the external world and the consequence is that there is bondage. In this sense, Jainism is dualistic. There is a dichotomous division of the categories into the living and the non-living.

Jainism considers the soul from two points of view: (1) noumenal (*niścaya*) and (2) phenomenal (*vyavahāra*). Kundakundācārya points out that the practical point of view is as much necessary to understand the concepts of the self as the real point

11. *Ibid*: 10.

12. *Ibid*: 11, 12.

13. *Ibid*: 12.

14. *Ibid*: 38.

of view, just as a Non-āryan is never capable of understanding without the non-āryan tongue.

The existence of the soul is a pre-supposition in Jaina philosophy. No proofs are necessary. And Mahāvira said, "O Gautama, the soul is *pratyakṣa*, for that in which your knowledge consists is itself soul". It is *pratyakṣa* owing to the 'ahaṃ *pratyakṣa*', the realisation of the self.¹⁵ The existence of the soul can be inferred. Then Mahāvira said the soul exists because, "it is my word, O Gautama".¹⁶ The soul is different from the senses and the body. The sense organs are like the windows through which the soul sees, just as Devadatta perceives the external world through the windows.¹⁷ From the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is pure consciousness. It is no other than itself. Kunakundācārya says that from the noumenal point of view the soul and the body are not one. Again from the noumenal point of view, the soul is pure and perfect. It is simple and not composite. In the *Sthānāṅga* we get the description of the soul as one.¹⁸ In *Samayasāra*, Kundakundācārya describes the absolute oneness of the soul on the strength "of myself-realisation".¹⁹ This does not mean that the soul is one in the Advaitic sense. It only emphasises the identity of the content of the soul. If the souls were one, then "O Gautama, there would be no *sukha*, *dukha*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*".²⁰ The individual souls are different like the *kumbhas*,²¹

The nature of *jīva* haas been described by Nemicandra from the noumenal and the phenomenal point of view. From the noumenal point of view the soul is pure and perfect. It is con-

15. *Gapadharavāda* : 109.

16. *Ibid* : 34.

17. (a) *Gapadharavāda* : 109.

(b) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* : 33.

18. *Sthānāṅga* : "ege Atta" as quoted in *Abhidhāna Rājendra*—Vol. II—Atta.

19. *Samayasāra* : 5. and *Dravyasangraha* : 2.3.

20. *Gapadharavāda* : 34.

21. *Dravyasāṅgraha* : 2.

sciousness, but from the phenomenal point of view, soul is characterised by *upayoga*. It is the agent, it has the same extent as its body, it is the enjoyer of the fruits of karma, it is in *samsara*.²² The characteristic and *upayoga* of *jiva* has to be re-defined in terms of psychology. Very often it has been translated as the result of consciousness. In my book 'Some Problems in Jaina Psychology', I have interpreted the term *upayoga* as "horme" as it has connotive prominence. I have here used the word *horme* in the sense of McDougall's use of the word *horme*. *Jnana* and *darshana* are manifestations of *upayoga* in the light of the *cetana*.²³

From the phenomenal point of view *jiva* is also described as possessing of *pranas*, life forces. They are: *indriya*, *prana*, *bala prana*, *ayu prana*, and *anaprana*.²⁴ The *jiva* is the doer (*kartā*), enjoyer (*bhokta*), limited to his body (*dehamatra*), still incorporeal and it is ordinarily found with karma. As the potter considers himself the maker of the pot, so also the mundane soul considers itself to be the doer of activities.²⁵ However, from the noumenal point of view, *jiva* is the doer of *suddhabhava*, pure thought and from the phenomenal point of view it is the doer of *pudgala* karma.²⁶

Pancastikaya describes the *atman* as the agent of its own *bhavas*. But it is not the agent of the *pudgala* karmas.²⁷

We have seen that due to the contact with *ajiva*, the *jiva* engages itself in activity and activity brings in the influx of karma. Due to the influx of karma the soul gets entangled in the wheel of *samsara* and embodied through the operation of karma. When

22. *Ibid*: 2, 3.

23. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*: (Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1961) pp. 30-32.

24. *Pancastikayasara*: 41.

25. *Pancastikayasara*: 27 and *Samayasara*: 124.

26. (a) *Pancastikayasara*: 20-27.

(b) *Dravyasahgraha*: 8, 9.

27. *Pancastikayasara*: 6, 28.

the soul is embodied it is effected by the environment like the physical and social environment in different ways. This entanglement is beginningless. But it has an end. The end is perfection which the soul attains when it gets itself free from the encrustations of karma. Regarding the characteristic of its pervasion, it has been suggested that the soul has the power of pervading the entire body, big or small, just as the light of the lamp illuminates the room whether big or small.²⁸ Jacobi says that Jainas have a tenet of the size of the soul which is not shared by other philosophers.²⁹

Jiva is characterised by the upward motion (*ūrdhvagati*). Nemicandra describes the pure soul as possessing *ūrdhvagati*³⁰. In the *Pancāstikāyasāra* it is said that when the soul is freed from all impurities it moves upwards to the end of the *loka*.³¹ The Jaina conception of soul as possessing *ūrdhvagati* has more an ethical content than a metaphysical status. The main purpose appears to lead the soul to perfection in the *Siddhaśilā*. And this is possible if it has its inherent characteristic of upward motion. Similarly, in the *Pancāstikāyasāra* the soul is described as imparting lustre to the body, just as a lotus hued ruby, when placed in a cup of milk, imparts its lustre to the milk.³²

The embodied souls have been classified on the basis of various principles like the status and the number of sense-organs possessed by them. There are the *sthāvira jivas*, immovable souls. This is the vegetable kingdom. Then there are the *trasa jivas*, mobile souls. *Trasa jivas* have two to five senses. Worms, oysters, conches etc. possess taste and touch. They are two-sensed organisms. The five-sensed organisms are classified as *samanaska* and there are organisms which are *amanaska*. In *Gommatasāra jivakānda* a detailed classification of *samsāri jivas* is indicated in the table (See page 42).

28. *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 10.


29. Jacobi (H): *Studies in Jainism* (Edt: Jina Vijaya Muni), pp. 83.

30. *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 11-14.

31. *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 79.

32. *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 33.

THE TABLE OF CLASSIFICATION OF SAMSĀRI JIVAS ACCORDING TO GOMMATASARA JIVAKANDA



From the phenomenal point of view *Jivas* have been classified into fourteen types on the basis of *Mārgaṇa* and *Guṇasthāna*. But, from the pure point of view all souls are pure.³³ These distinctions have been based on the ethical and spiritual considerations, more than the metaphysical consideration. The purification of the soul depends on the subsidence and destruction of the karmas. When the karma is removed the soul becomes pure and perfect. In the liberated state, the *Jiva* resides at the top of the *loka* and is possessed of eight supreme qualities: *Samyaktva*, *Jñāna*, *Darśana*, *Virya*, *Sūkṣma*, *Avagāhana*, *Agurulaghu* and *Avyāvādha*. The liberated soul lives in eternal bliss.³⁴ But the state of the soul is not to be considered as that of identity with the Absolute. Each soul retains its identity and lives in its pure and perfect state. In this connection, we may draw the analogy from a Western thinker regarding the status of the self in the perfect state. McTaggart's analogy of the "College of Selves" would appear to be apt, although what type of spiritual unity there is in *mokṣa*, Jainism cannot say. The never ceasing struggle of the soul is an important tenet in Jainism. The universe is not, then, an amusing pantomime of infallible marionettes, but a fight for perfection, in which "something is eternally gained for the universe by the success".³⁵

So far we have considered the first principle of the Jainas that is *Jiva*. It is the fundamental principle which is responsible for the structure of philosophy as given by the Jainas on the realistic pattern. The next principle is *Ajiva*. It is the non-living principle. It is complementary to the *Jiva* and infact contrary to the *Jiva*. The Jaina view of the universe consists of a dichotomous division of the universe into the living and non-living, *jīva* and *ajīva*.

Ajīva is of two kinds: *Rūpi Ajīva* (non-living substance with form). It is matter and *Arūpi Ajīva* is formless. Matter is called *pudgala*. The other four principles of *ajīva* are *Dharma*

33. *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 36.

34. *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 14.

35. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*, pp. 14.

(principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest), *akāśa* (space) and *kāla* (time). They are substances. In the Āgama literature substances having form are called "mūrta" and those substances which have no form are called "amūrta". This classification of the *Ajiva* substances has the cosmological overtone. The Jainas, being realists in their approach, have attempted to present the foundational principle of the universe from the points of view of matter and energy. Both of them are equally important. *Sthānāṅga* gives the metaphysical analysis of the distinction between the living and the non-living substances.⁸⁶

Jainas have made a significant contribution to the understanding of the non-living substance called matter. It is *jada* in the Āgamas sometimes *Ātman* embodied and associated with matter is also called *pudgala*.⁸⁷ But primarily the word *pudgala* refers to the non-living substance which has form. We have already seen, five of the six substances except *kāla* are called *astikāya*, because they have the characteristic of *astitva* (existence) and *kāyatva* (extension). *Jiva*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *ākāśa* do not possess the characteristic of *samyoga* (conjunction) and *vibhāga* (disjunction). These disjunctions are denoted by means of atoms. If we imagine extension, if possible of the four substances, we find that *jiva*, *dharma*, *adharma* have innumerable parts; while *ākāśa* is indivisible and endless. *Pudgala* is divisible and the last point of division of matter is the atom. Atom can be looked at as macro-cosmic. It is mentioned as *mahāskhand*, as it pervades the entire universe.

Pudgala (matter) is a substance and it can be classified into four distinctions: (1) *Skandha* (aggregate), (2) *Skandhadesa* (aggregate occupying space), (3) *Skandha pradesa* (aggregate occupying limited space) and (4) *Paramāṇu* (atom).⁸⁸ The unit of formed matter (*mūrta dravya*) is *skanda*. It is the aggregate of atoms. It may be considered to be a molecule. It may be

36. *Sthānāṅga*: 2, 1, 57.

37. *Bhagavati*: 8, 10, 361.

38. (a) *Bhagavati*: 2, 10, 66.

(b) *Uttarādhyayana*: 36, 10.

constituted of two atoms, three atoms or a number of atoms. Such an aggregate of atoms is a unit. This unit can be measured by mental construction and it is called *skandha desa*. The inseparable unit of a *skandha* is called *skandha pradeśa*. *Paramāṇu* is the indivisible point of matter which is the minimal limit. Atoms constitute the universe and atoms combine into various forms in order to form the objects. Jaina theory of atomism is very ancient because Jainism is based on its theory of atomism and matter.³⁹

We have already seen that *paramāṇu* is indivisible. It is indestructible, inaccessible to senses and it cannot be further divided. The description of the characteristics of an atom as given by the Jainas may raise certain difficulties in the light of the study of atom in modern science. Modern science has shown that atom can be split. But if *paramāṇu* is indivisible, is it possible to go below this limit or above it for the sake of finding out whether there is any possibility of understanding the concept of the splitting of the atoms? In the *Anuyogadvāra* we get a satisfactory answer to this problem. It has been suggested that *paramāṇu* is of two forms: (1) *sūkṣma paramāṇu* (subtle atom) and (2) *Vyavahāra paramāṇu* (*paramāṇu* in the practical sense).⁴⁰ *Sūkṣma paramāṇu* is indivisible and indestructible. *Vyavahāra paramāṇu* consists of aggregate of endless *sūkṣma paramāṇus*.⁴¹ The *vyavahāra paramāṇu* can be split and splitting of the atom can be understood in this sense.

Pudgala has four primary characteristics: (1) *sparsa* (touch), (2) *rasa* (taste), (3) *gandha* (smell) and (4) *varpa* (colour). In every *paramāṇu* of the matter, these four characteristics are present expressing themselves into variations into different intensities. From the point of view of substances *paramāṇu* is partless and indivisible, but from the point of view of the modes it is not

39. Jacobi: (H): *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, pp. 199-200.

40. *Anuyogadvāra*: *Pramāṇa dvara*:

“*Paramāṇu duvihe paṇṇatte, tam jahā—suhumeya vhabahāriyeya*” I

41. *Bhagavati*: 5, 7.

so.⁴² *Paramāṇu* is accessible to sense experience. It is formless. It is so subtle that even when it has form, the senses cannot grasp. The omniscient souls alone can see the *paramāṇu* both in their formed and formless states. But one who has only sense experience cannot see the *paramāṇu*.⁴³

We have seen that the *paramāṇus* combine themselves into *skandha* (molecule). The process of combination is not be traced to any outside force or agency. They are due to certain characteristics like viscosity and dryness. In this we find that the Digambara and the Śvetāmbara traditions present slightly different versions of the process of combination of atoms. They have given a detailed schemata of process of the combination on the basis of *Sādr̄śa* and *Viṣadṛśa* combinations. We need not go to the details of this analysis.

We have also seen that *pudgala* (matter) can be classified into atom (*paramāṇu*) and the combination of atoms (molecules). Matter has also been classified on the nature and the intensity of the combination of molecules in various forms. There are six types of matter on the basis of such distinction.⁴⁴ (1) *Sthūla sthūla* (very gross) like objects—stone etc., (2) *Sthūla* (gross) like liquids—milk curd, water etc., (3) *Sthūla sūkṣma* (gross subtle) like—light, electricity, heat etc., (4) *Sūkṣma-sthūla* (subtle gross) like vapour, wind etc., (5) *Sūkṣma* (subtle)—*Manovargaṇās*, (6) *Sūkṣma sūkṣma* (very subtle)—*paramāṇu*.

Similary, combinations of *paramāṇus* have been considered on the basis of the degree of subtlety of combination. In this there

42. *Sthānāṅga* : 4, 135.

“Caovihe poggalapariṇāme paṇṇatte, tam jahā vāṇapariṇāme, gandhapariṇāme, rasapariṇāme, phasapariṇāme”.

43. *Bhagavati* : 18, 8.

44. (a) *Niyamasāra* :

(b) *Gommatasāra* : *Jivakāṇḍa* : 603

“Bādarabādara, bādara, bādarasuhuma ca suhumathūlam ca I suhumam, suhumaśuhumam, dharādiyamodi chabbheyam” II.

are several combinations from the gross objects to the *manovar-gaṇas*.⁴⁵ Eight combinations have been mentioned.

In the Āgamic literature we find a detailed study of the nature, the characteristics and the process of the combinations of matter and its various modes. It would be desirable to make a thorough study of the Jaina theory of matter in the light of the researches in modern physics. We are likely to get startling similarity in the conceptual analysis of the matter as given by the Jainas and also of the recent study of matter in physics. But this is beyond the scope of our study.

Dharmāstikāya: In this universe *jīva* and *pudgala* have the capacity to movement but it does not mean that they are constantly moving. They have motion as a capacity while the other four *dravyas* have no capacity of motion. Therefore *jīva* and *pudgala* have been considered as *gatiśīla* and the others are *stitiśīla*. For this kind of movement and rest, there need to be a media. That is supplied by the principles, of motion and the principle of rest. *Dharma* is the principle of motion and *adharma* is the principle of rest.⁴⁶ The terms *dharma* and *adharma* are here taken in the cosmic sense and have no ethical flavour. *Dharma* is the principle which is one and eternal. It is the principle of motion by which things in the world moved. Movement is possible because of this principle. *Dharma* is itself un-moved. But movement is possible because of this principle. It has been suggested that Ether is this principle. There is an analogy very often quoted in this connection. Just as the movement for the fish is possible in water so also movement in this universe is possible through the principle of *dharma*. Water itself may not have motion but the fish in the water can move because they are in water. In this sense water is the medium of motion. Similary *dharma* is the principle through which motion is possible.

Gautama asked Mahāvira: what is the principle of *Dharmāstikaya* for the *jīvas*? Mahāvira said, "O, Gautama if the

45. *Bhagavati*: 8, 1, 1.

46. *Bhagavati*: 18, 7-10,

principle of *dharma* were not operative there would be no motion— who would come? and who would go? how could the waves of the sound travel? how could the eyelids open? how would you talk?—the whole world would have remained stationery but for the principle of *dharma*":⁴⁷

Adharmāstikāya: It is the principle of rest. As *dharma* is necessary for movement, *adharma* is necessary for rest. It is also the cosmic principle, because of this, things in the world are sometimes stationery, when it is necessary to be stationery. Just as the shade of a tree induces rest for the tired and the weary, so also the principle of *adharma* is the basis of rest. It is the cosmic principle and it is indistrictible. The two principles of *dharma* and *adharma* are necessary for the functions in the universe. They are operative in the limited sphere of the steller universe and not beyond the Limitless.

Gautama asked Mahāvira, "What is the use of *adharmāstikāya* for the *jivas*?" Mahāvira said, "O Gautama, if the *adharmastikāya* were not to operate as the principle of rest, who would stand, who would rest, who would sit, who would sleep and who could remain silent? The world would have been in constant movement without break if the principle of *adharma* were not to operate. All that is steady and at rest is due to this principle of rest".⁴⁸

A question has been asked—*Dharma* and *Adharma* are formless. Being formless how can they assist motion and rest? The answer is that the capacity to help for rest or motion does not depend upon its characteristic of formlessness. Just as *Ākāśa* is formless but it still accommodates various things, so also *dharma* and *adharma* assist motion and rest although they are formless.

Another question has been asked regarding the all-pervading nature of *dharma* and *adharma*. If *dharma* and *adharma* were to be all-pervading, then they must interpenetrate at each-other. But

47. *Bhagavati*: 13, 4.

48. *Ibid.*

the interpenetration is not necessary, although they co-exist. Just as numerous lights illumine the room and each light pervades the entire room, so also *dharma* and *adharma* are all-pervading and there should be no contradiction. Some have suggested that the principle of *dharma* is the gravitational field. Some others have suggested that the principle of *dharma* may be compared to the laws of motion but these problems need further study.

Ākāśa: That substance which accommodates *jīva*, *pudgala*, *dharma*, *adharma* and *kāla* is *Ākāśa dravya*.⁴⁹ It is the basis of all *dravyas* and therefore it has a special function.⁵⁰ *Ākāśa* is not specially a *dravya* although it is called *dravya*, because it is empty space and it accommodates all things. It is all-pervading (*sarvavyāpi*), formless (*amūrtta*) and it has infinite points of space (*anantapradesī*). *Ākāśa* is divided into two forms: *Lokākāśa* (limited space) and *Alokākāśa* (limitless beyond).⁵¹ As a lake gives space to the water, similarly *ākāśa* accommodates all things. *Ākāśa* is a limited space and the limitless beyond is *alokākāśa*.

A question has been asked that if *ākāśa* were to be one and continuous how can there be distinction between *lokākāśa* and *alokākāśa*? The answer is that this division is not on the basis of substance but it is with reference to the function of *dharma* and *adharma* in space. In the *alokākāśa* the principles of *dharma* and *adharma* do not operate. Similarly, a question has been asked as to why *alokākāśa* is called *ākāśa* although does not accommodate anything. For this, we can say that *alokākāśa* has the capacity of accommodation but as *dharma* and *adharma* do not operate, accommodation of thing is not possible.

49. *Dravyasaṅgraha* : 19.

Also *Tattvārthasūtra* : 5-8.

50. *Uttarādhyayana* : 28, 3.

“ Bhayanam savvadavvanam naham ogāhalakkhaṇam ।

51. *Uttarādhyayana* : 36, 2.

Lokākāśa has infinite number of *pradeśas* (space points) while *alokākāśa* has limitless space. *Ākāśa* itself is limitless and endless because, if infinite *pradeśas* are taken out from the limitless *ākāśa*, still infinite *pradeśas* remain. Therefore, considered from the point of view of the capacity of accommodation and also extension, *ākāśa* is considered as limitless.

From the point of view of extension *ākāśa* is limitless, and from the point of view of time *ākāśa* is beginningless and endless. But from the practical point of view and for the sake of conventional measurements, *ākāśa* has been divided into different measures of time, like *Dik* and other conventional measurements of meter, kilometer etc. The directions like the east and the west, upward and downward (*Urdhwa* and *Adhodisa*) are also measurements from the practical point of view.⁵² *Disakam* commences with two points of space of *ākāśa* and *disā* increases everything by two *pradeśas* and it covers infinite number of *pradeśas*. *Urdhwa* and *adhodisa* begin with four *pradeśas* and in these there are four *pradeśas* till the end. The direction like the east and the west are conventional measurements of time.⁵³ In the *Ācārāṅga sūtra* we get a similar description of the direction (*dik*) from the practical point of view. Suggestions have been given as to how to recognise east and the west etc....This distinction is called *prajñāpaka disā* (empirical direction).⁵⁴ But we should note that *disā* is not an independent substance. It is a conventional form of measurement. Similarly, *pradeśa* gives a pattern for the empirical measurement of *ākāśa*.

Sometimes Jaina concept of *ākāśa* has been compared with Newtonian conception of space. But the Jaina conception of space has reference to the two other principles like *dharma* and *adharma*. They are also substances. These two principles and *ākāśa* are not inherent. In this sense, Ether as a substance cannot be explained without the conception of *ākāśa*. Therefore, it is

52. *Ācārāṅga-niryukti*: 42, 44.

53. *Ācārāṅga-niryuktī*: 47, 48.

54. *Ibid.*: 51.

difficult to have comparison with the Jaina concept of *ākāśa* and the modern scientific theory of space.

Gautama asked Mahāvira, "what is principle of substance of *ākāśa* and what is the purpose of *ākāśa* for the *jīvas* and *ajīvas*?" Mahāvira said, "If *ākāśa* were not to be there, where would the *jīvas* be? Where would the *dharma* and *adharma* pervade? Where would the *kāla* extend? Where would the dance of *pudgala* be possible? The whole world would be without foundation."⁵⁵

Kāla :

Kāla is the substance in which the movement of the object would be experienced. In Jaina metaphysics there are two prominent views regarding the nature of *kāla* (time). According to one view *kāla* is considered to be the mode of the substances of *jīva* and *ajīva*. In this sense, *kāla* is not an independent substance. According to the second view *kāla* is given the status of an independent substance, like *jīva* and *ajīva*. In this sense, *kāla* cannot become the expression of change in the objects, although it is the medium of change. *Kāla* is the *dravya* (substance), though it is not an *astikāya*, because it has no *kāyatva* (multi-dimensionality). It has only linear dimension. In the Śvetāmbara Āgamic literature there is the mention of both the views in *Bhagavati sūtra*,⁵⁶ *Uttarādhyayana*⁵⁷ and *Prajñāpanā*.⁵⁸ The Digambara Acāryās like Kundakunda,⁵⁹ Pūjyapāda,⁶⁰ Akalanka,⁶¹ and Vidyanandi⁶² have mentioned *kāla* as an independent substance.

On the basis of the first view of *kāla* as a mode of substance, the measurable distances of time like *samaya*, *muhūrta*,

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55. *Bhagavati* : 13, 4.

56. *Bhagavati* : 25, 4, 734.

Q, 4

57. *Uttarādhyayana* : 28, 7-8.

L 8

58. *Prajñāpanā*—pāda : 1, sūtra 3.

59. *Pravacanasāra* : 2, 46-47.

60. *Tattvārthasūtra* : *Sarvārtha-siddhi* : 5, 38-39.

61. *Tattvārtha-rājavārtikā* : 5, 38-39.

62. *Tattvārtha-sloka-vārtikā* : 5, 38-39.

day and night are modes of *kāla* from the practical point of view. These modes are special features of the substances *jīva* and *ajīva* and these modifications with their clusters are considered as *kāla*. *Kāla* by itself is not an independent substance.

According to the view which makes *kāla* an independent substance like the other substances *jīva* and *ajīva*, *kāla* is a substance and change is possible in *kāla*. However, the two views are not inconsistent with each other. From the noumenal point of view *kāla* is the mode of the *jīva* and *ajīva* and is not an independent substance. But from the phenomenal point of view *kāla* is considered to be an independent substance. The changes in the various objects are possible in time and the conventional measurements of time have reference to the modes of substances of *jīva* and *ajīva*.⁶³

If we survey Jaina literature we find there are two views mentioned regarding the constitution of the universe. (1) mentioning six *dravyas*, and the other (2) five *astikāyās* excluding time. In the Digambara literature *kāla* is not merely considered as an aspect of or an expression of human intellect with reference to human activity but it is also pervading the entire universe. We have seen that although time is a substance it is not to be included in the substances because of its monodimensional characteristic. It has no magnitude. It is linear. Therefore time is always forward-looking.⁶⁴ From the empirical point of view Sthānāṅga mentions four types of *kāla*: (1) *Pramāṇakāla* (measurable time), (2) *Yathāyunivṛttikāla* (time with reference to duration), (3) *Maranakāla* (moment of death), (4) *Addhakāla* (based on the revolution of the Sun and the Moon).⁶⁵

The Jainas have worked out a schematic presentation of the empirical time in mathematical terms. The unit of time forms the present. The particles of time are innumerable, invisible,

63. (a) *Bhagavati*: 2, 10, 120: 11, 11, 424: 13. 4, 482-483.

(b) *Prajñāpanā*—pāda 1.

(c) *Uttarādhyayana*: 28, 10.

64. *Dravyasahgraha*: 22.

65. *Sthānāṅga*: 4.

inactive and without form. These particles exist, each in its own capacity, and are without activity. The present forms one unit (*samaya*), the future has as many *samayas* as the past plus one. The past has as many *samayas* as the future minus one. Total time will be twice the amount of past plus one as twice the amount of future minus one. Even the smallest calculable fraction of time, the *avalika*, consists of as many *samayas* as all the remaining others that are being recorded.⁶⁶

(b) From the spiritual point of view the fundamental principles like *āśrava*, *bandha*, *saṃvara*, *nirjarā* and *mokṣa* have been considered as significant for the realization of the highest perfection. We have so far analysed the fundamental principles of *jīva* and *ajīva* as the essential constituents of the universe. We shall now present a brief survey of the principles mentioned above from the spiritual point of view. The ultimate end of life is to attain perfection. It is *mokṣa*. That is the end for all Indian philosophers except Cārvāka. The soul due to contact with *ajīva* has its activity. Due to the activity of the soul (*yoga*) karmic particles flow into the soul. This influx of karmic matter is called *āśrava*. The soul forgets its original nature due to the encrustation of karma and gets involved in the wheel of life. This involvement is beginningless but it has an end. The involvement in the wheel of *saṃsāra* is due to the influx of karma. Just as water flows into a pond from different streamlets, so also *karma* flows into the soul from different directions due to various types of activity.⁶⁷

This influx of *karma* has been distinguished into two types : (1) *Dravya āśrava* and the other (2) *Bhāvāśrava*. The influx of karmic matter which causes *jñānāvaraṇiya* and other karmas is *dravyāśrava*.⁶⁸ The karmic matter enters into the soul and obscures its capacity of knowledge, intuition and activity. That

66. Schubring: *The Doctrines of the Jainas* (Banarasidas, 1962) pp. 128.

67. (a) *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*: *Silavṛtti*: 2, 5, 17.

(b) *Āvaśyaka Vṛtti* (Haribhadra) : pp. 84.

68. *Dravyasahgraha* : 31.

modification of the soul by which karma gets into it is called the *bhāvāśrava*. The *bhāvāśrava* refers to the psychic impediments which are responsible for the creation of the conditions of the influx of karma, and *dravyāśrava* refers to the corpus of the karmic particles flowing into the soul and causing bondage. The *bhāvāśrava* would in a sense become the condition for the influx of the karmic matter. But at the same time *dravyāśrava* does bring certain psychic accompaniments which are responsible for the psychic states and events producing the conditions for the influx of the karmic matter. *Āśrava* refers to the source through which karmic matter flows into the soul. In this sense we may distinguish five sources from which karmic matter flows in :

(1) *Mithyātva* : It is the perversity of outlook. It may be distinguished into two types : (i) *sahaja mithyātva* (inherent perversity) and (ii) *grahita mithyātva*. It is acquired by perversity. In both these forms there is the absence of hunger and thirst for rightiousness. Perversity of attitude is the root cause of all evil and it binds the *jīva* to the endless wheel of *samsāra*.

(2) *Avirati* : It is absence of self-control. A person who has no control over his senses indulges in sense pleasures and he loses direction for the attainment of self-realization.

(3) *Pramāda* : It is negligence or indifference to the higher values of life. Indulgence in sense pleasures leads one to negligence, and it again leads to the interest in listening to stories which are connected with sense pleasures. We fall from the spiritual values and it leads to *pramāda*. Therefore, Mahāvīra said : "Do not be negligent in your duties, not even for a moment."⁶⁹

(4) *Kasāya* : It refers to passion. It creates mental states which are intensely affective in nature. They are intense feeling and emotions like anger (*krodha*), igoity (*māna*), infatuation (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*).⁷⁰ These passions are responsible for

69. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* :

70. *Dasaśaikālikasūtra* : "Cincanti mūlāśīm puṇabhadvassai".

the influx of karma. Just as a field is ploughed and made ready for sowing, so also *kaṣāyas* prepare the mental-set and mental readiness for the influx of karmic particles.⁷¹

(5) *Yoga*: It is activity which is possible through body, (*kāya*) speech (*vāca*) and mind (*manasa*). The ātman is active and these activities are confirmed to the above three. All such activities prepare the ground for the influx of karma.

Āśrava has also been classified into two types on the basis of the nature of the source through which karmic particles flow in : (1) *Kaṣāyānuranjita Āśrava* : It is due to the affliction of passion. It is also called *samparāyika āśrava*. The second type of *āśrava* is due to activity (*yoga*) and not so much due to that affliction of passions. It is *Iryāpatha āśrava*.

The Buddhist conception of *āśrava* in Pāli literature is referred to as *āśrava*. *Āśrava* is the perverse expression of *avidyā* and *kleśa*. It is a specific form of perversity. Jacobi says that the concept of *āśrava*, *saṁvara* and *nirjarā* used in Jainism are very ancient. The Buddhist conception of *āśrava* is similar to that of Jainas. Therefore, it is clear that the karma theory and the conception of *āśrava* of the Jainas is much earlier to the Buddhist conceptions.⁷²

Bandha : The principle of *bandha* is an important spiritual concept in Jainism. It is bondage, and it leads one to the ever-recurring involvement in the wheel of life. The bondage is due to the influx of karma. *Āśrava* brings *bandha*.

Bandha may be considered as of two types : (1) *Dravya bandha*. It is the bondage that is due to the influx of karmic particiles into the soul. (2) *Bhāvabandha* refers to the psychic states that lead us to the involvement in this wheel of life. These two forms of bondage due to karma are complementary to each other, and are intimately connected with the other. Just as the

71. Dhavalā : "Dukkha sasyam karmakṣetram kṛṣanti phalavatkurvanti Iti kaṣāyah".

72. *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* : pp. 572.

dust particles settle securely on a piece of cloth which we soak in oil, so also the karmic particle gets settled in the soul due to *kaṣāya* and *yoga*.

Bandha has been distinguished into four types: (1) *Prakṛti bandha*—it refers to the nature of karma that has entered into the soul. (2) *Stiti bandha*—it has reference to the state and the limitation of karmic particles in the soul. (3) *Anubhāga bandha*—refers to the intensity of experience of karma which leads to the intensity of the bondage. (4) *Pradesa bandha*—is concerned with the extensiveness and the aggregates of the karmic particles associated with the soul. Just as a pudding (*modaka*) with its medicinal values may be used for curing several types of diseases, similarly some form of karma is responsible for some types of difficulties like the obscuration of knowledge. Others inhibit energy of the soul. Similarly just as some puddings have efficacy for a day and some others for longer time, similarly the karmic particles have their intensities in their experiences in varying degrees. Thus the *prakṛti*, *stiti*, *anubhāga* and *pradesa bandha* are intimately associated with the karmic particles and they are effects in the soul.⁷⁸

So far we have seen that the soul gets involved in the wheel of life and is bound (*bandha*) due to the influx of karma. This bondage, as we said earlier is beginning-less but it has an end. The soul in its inherent capacity is pure and perfect and the ultimate end of life is to remove this bondage and to be free from the shackles of karma. This is possible by means of a process which gradually eliminates the karmic particles and sometimes reduces the intensity of the effects of karma (*kṣayopasama*). From now onwards the upward process for self-realization starts. We have to take two fundamental steps in this direction. (1) *Samvara* - refers to the stoppage of influx of karma and (2) *Nirjarā* - which refers to the removal of the accumulate of

73. (a) *Dravyasāṅgraha* : 31-35.

(b) *Gommatasāra jivakāṇḍa* : 300-305.

(c) *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* : 88.

karma. These two are graduated steps. *Samvara* has first to be there and then we can adopt *nirjarā*.

Samvara

Samvara is the stoppage of the influx of karma. As the inflowing water through the inlets is prevented from coming in, in order to clean the tank, so also the influx of karma from different sources has to be stopped first if the bondage is to be removed. The function of *samvara* is the first step towards the realization of the self in the spiritual sphere.

Samvara is of two types: (1) *Dravya Samvara* and (2) *Bhāva samvara*.⁷⁴ *Dravya samvara* refers to the stoppage of the influx of the karmic particles of matter. It helps reducing possibilities of the long duration of *samsāra*. The psychic accompaniment of the influx of karmic particles have also to be stopped. The stoppage of the psychic accompaniments and psychic causes of the influx of karma is the *bhāvasamvara*.

The process of *samvara* would be possible through its various forms which primarily consist of mental and moral discipline. It has been suggested that there are 57 ways of *samvara*: (a) 5 *samitis* (*Irīya samiti*, *Bhāṣā samiti*, *Eṣanā samiti*, *Ādāna nikṣepana samiti* and *Utsarga samiti*) (b) 3 *Guptis* (*Kāya*, *Vāca* and *Manasa*) (c) Control of 22 *pariṣahas*. (d) 10 duties (*daśalakṣaṇa*). (e) 5 *Caritras* (Rules of conduct). (f) 12 *Anuprekṣās* (Reflection).⁷⁵ "In the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* it is said that he who is purified by meditating upon these forms of *samvara* is compared to the ship in water which is sailing towards the other shore of perfection.

It has also been suggested that *samvara* is of 5 types: These five types are (1) *Vrata* (Practice of vows) (2) *Apramāda*

74. (a) *Sthānāṅga*: 1, 14 and *Tika*,
 (b) *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 2, 142 & *Vṛtti* of *Amṛtacandra*.
 (c) *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 2, 34.

75. (a) *Kārtikeyānuprekṣa*: 89-92.
 (b) *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 2, 36, 37.

(Deligence) (3) *Samyaktva* (Right attitude of mind and right knowledge) (4) *Akaśāya* (Avoiding the passions) (5) *Ayoga*.⁷⁶ It is cessation of activity. In addition to these it has been suggested that you should avoid violence, untruth, theft, non-celibacy, and possessions (*parigrha*). Similarly we should control five senses.⁷⁷ All these, physical and mental disciplines are aimed at the moral and spiritual development in the direction of the preparation of the further ground for the removal of karma. *Dvādaśānuprekṣa* gives a similar description of the four forms of *saṃvara* as (1) *Samyaktva saṃvara* (2) *Dasavrata saṃvara* (3) *Kaśāya saṃvara* and (4) *Yoga saṃvara*.⁷⁸ In the *Samayasāra* also *saṃvara* has been distinguished into four types of processes like the removal of *mithyātva*, of perversity, of ignorance, practice of self-control and the curtailment of activity (yoga).⁷⁹ Similar conception of *saṃvara* has been presented by the Buddhist for the sake of self realization. The *Tathāgata* has mentioned six types of *saṃvara*. In the *Anguttaranikāya* it has been suggested that the stoppage of influx of karma is possible by the removal of *avidyā*.⁸⁰

Nirjarā

After *saṃvara*, we come to the processes of *Nirjarā*. The function of *saṃvara* is to arrest the influx of karma through different sources by stopping the inlets. But the function of *nirjarā*

76. (a) *Sthānāṅga*: 4, 2, 418.
 (b) *Samavāyāṅga*: 5.

77. (a) *Praśnavyākarana*: *Samvaradvāra*: 5.
 (b) *Sthānāṅga*: 5, 2, 418 & 10, 1, 709,

78. *Dvādaśānuprekṣā*: *Samvarānuprekṣā*: 65.
 "Sammattam Desavayam Mahavyamtaha Jāo Kasayāśam
 Adede samvaram ana māṇa jogābhāvo tahaccheva".

79. *Samayasāra*: 190-191.
 "Micchattam appāpām avirayabhāvo ya"
 "Jōgō ya".
 "Heu abhāve niyāma jāyadi nāpiissa asava piroho".

80. *Anguttaranikāya*: 6, 58.

is to remove the accumulated karma already present in the soul. Just as, if a tank is to be cleaned, we first stop the inlets of water and then remove the accumulated water, similarly *samvara* stops the influx of karma while *nirjarā* removes the accumulated karma.⁸¹ In the *Dvādaśānuprekṣa*, it has been said that the karma that has already been accumulated has to be removed, that is *Nirjarā*.⁸² The processes of *Nirjarā* is a gradual processes of purification of soul. That would lead to *Mokṣa*. *Nirjarā* is of two types: (1) *Sakāma Nirjarā* and (2) *Akāma Nirjarā*. In *sakāma nirjarā* the karmic particles are removed through the practice of *vṛata*. But in the case of *Akāma Nirjarā* the removal of karma is possible by the gradual process of the activity of the soul in its pure nature. In this, the righteous activities refer to the very nature of the soul. It has also been suggested that *nirjarā* is of two types: (1) *Abuddhipūrvaka* which is a natural process of exhaustion of karma through the experiences of life as in the case of Denizens of hell who exhaust karma through the compulsory tortures. (2) *Kuśalamūla Nirjarā* is possible through the practice of austerities (*tapas*) and the conquest of trouble.⁸³ In the *Candraprabhacarita*⁸⁴ we get a description of the two-fold function of *nirjarā* as (1) *Kālākṛta Nirjarā* in which there is a natural process of the exhaustion of karmas and *Upakramakṛta Nirjarā* which consists of the voluntary efforts of the removal of karma. Similar distinction have been mentioned in *Dvādaśānuprekṣa*.⁸⁵ In the *Sthānāṅga*, *Nirjarā* has been distinguished into various forms.⁸⁶ The processes of *nirjarā* has been referred to on the basis of the austerities which may be external as well as internal. External austerity (*tapas*) may be bodily which consists of the

81. (a) *Sarvārthasiddhi*: “Ekedesa karma saṃkṣaya lakṣana Nirjarā”.

(b) *Tattvārtharājavārtika*: 1, 4, 17.

82. *Dvādaśānuprekṣa*: 66

“Vaddhapadesaggalapam Nijjarapam idi jīneham pappattam”.

83. *Tattvārthabhbhāṣya*: 9, 7.

84. *Candraprabhacaritam*: 18, 109-110.

85. *Dvādaśānuprekṣa*: 103-104.

86. *Sthānāṅga*: 1, 16; Tīka.

practices like fasting, abstaining from certain types of food, controls of certain activities of the body through the control of the senses and through Yoga which is primarily concerned with practices of silence and other practices. Interier austerities are of six types: (1) Confession, (2) *Vinaya* (Reverence), (3) *Vaiyā-vratya* (Service) rendered to humanity and to the ascetics, (4) *Svādhāya* (Self study of the scripture), (5) *Dhyāna* (Meditation). Meditation has four forms, two auspicious and two inauspicious. Inauspicious meditation is more concerned with mental agitation regarding the things of the world and mental disturbances like revengeful activity. Auspicious meditation leads us to spirituality and finally to the attainment of the highest stage of concentration, this is *sukla dhyāna*. (6) *Utsarga* is absolute indifference to the body and the material needs. This leads to the ascetic practices. Ascetics alone can reach this stage. The analysis of *dhyāna* has a great psychological significance, and we find there is great deal of psychological acumen, in the analysis of the mental processes in the *dhyāna*. In the practice of *Kāyotsarga* it is possible to have all forms of difficulties and obstacles, it is also possible to suffer physical and mental tortures. But one who is engaged in the practice of *dhyāna* accept these troubles with equanimity.⁸⁷ *Kāyotsarga* has been distinguished into physical and the mental forms which refer to as *dravya-kāyotsarga* which is concerned with the bodily aspects of self-control, and *bhāvayakāyotsarga* which refers to the psychic accompaniments of the processes of self-control.⁸⁸

Mokṣa

When the self is freed from the bondage of karma and has passed beyond the possibility of rebirth it is said to have attained *mokṣa*. *Mokṣa* is the highest ideal to be attained by the self at the time of perfection. Sri Aurobindo considered the concept of

87. *Āvāyakaniryukti*: 1549.

88. *Āvāyakacūrpi*:

“So puṇṇa kāussaggo dāvvato bhavato ya bhavati
Dāvvato kayacetta niroho bhavato kāussaggo jhāṇam”.

mokṣa to be the central point of Indian thought. All the systems of Indian philosophy except the Caravaka, accept the concept of *mokṣa*.

According to the Jainas the soul in its real nature is pure and perfect. But due to its activity owing to its contact with *ajiva* it accumulates karma and gets involved in the wheel of life. But the end of the removal of karma is possible for a *jīva* if his eyes turn towards spiritual realization. By his voluntary efforts and not depending on any superior deity or God for grace, one can attain the state of highest perfection by one's own efforts. This state of highest perfection is called *mokṣa*. Jainas say that the *jīva* has a characteristic of *Ordhvagati* (tendency to move upwards).⁸⁹ When the karmic particles are removed and when the soul is free from all the karmic encrustations, it moves upward to the end of *lokākāśa* and remains in its pure form in the *siddha loka*, at the end of *lokākāśa*. It does not move further because there is the absence of the *dharma astikāya* in the *alokākāśa*. The Jaina literature presents a picture of *Siddha Silā*, and the description of the *Siddha Silā* given by the Jainas is its peculiarity. According to the Jainas the world where the human-beings inhabit has the extent of 45 lakhs of *yojanās* and the extent of *Siddha kṣetra* has also 45 lakhs of *yojanās*. In this there is a special point about the possibility of assignment of *mokṣa* by the *jīva*. The efforts for the attainment of *mokṣa* are possible only for human beings in this *karmabhūmi*. Even the Gods in heaven have to be reborn as human beings if they have to strive for the attainment of *mokṣa*.

The final stage of self-realisation is the stage of absolute perfection. In this stage all empirical adjuncts, like the bodily functions are removed. The soul enters the third stage of *sukla dhyāna*. This state lasts only for the period of time required to pronounce five short syllables.⁹⁰ At the end of this period, the

89. *Uttarādhyayana*: 19, 82.

"Uḍḍham pakkamai disam".

90. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Jaina View of Life*, pp. 134.

soul attains perfect and disembodied liberation. This is a stage of perfection. However, the Jaina conception of *mokṣa* does not obliterate the individuality of each soul. It is neither merged nor is identical with anything higher than itself. Its individuality is not lost. There is a permanent personality of the soul even in the state of perfection. We have elsewhere referred to McTaggart's analogy of the "College of selves" in order to explain the status of the soul in the state of perfection.

Jaina Way of Life

We have, so far, covered considerable ground in understanding Jainism in its aspects of Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics. Jaina theory with reference to these topics has been built up as a super-structure on the foundations of Jaina Ethics and the Jaina way of Life. Jaina Ethics is primary, just like Buddhist Ethics is primary for Buddhist philosophy. The *Tirthankaras* showed the way towards perfection and the way towards perfection is not primarily metaphysical. Metaphysics is a super-structure built on our understanding of the human way of life. Jainas built their metaphysics on the realistic and the *Anekānta* approaches. The ultimate perfection is to be achieved through human efforts; no divine grace is necessary. Therefore, the human life and also, as a preparation, the *jīva* in other lives, is responsible for its own destiny. Man in this sense is the architect of his own perfection and the ideal way of life. However, he is determined to some extent by the physical and mental traces that he has acquired by his own deeds in the past and in the preceding lives. That is the heritage that he has brought along with him in the preceding lives. Therefore, he has to meet these challenges and to foster his own destiny and the way to self-realisation standing on his own shoulders. *Tirthankaras* and the *Ācāryas* have preached these principles of self-help and self-effort. The Buddha in his last words before attaining *nirvāṇa* said to his disciples, "seek your own salvation with diligence." Mahavira said to his disciples, "make your own efforts for self-realisation". But the way to self-realisation is long and arduous and we have to be guided and led by the prophets and the seers, like kindly light, to lead us on. The challenges are many and the predominant challenge that we have to face is

the insurmountable hurdle of the enormous weight of karma that we have carried from life to life. It would be, therefore, necessary to study the nature of this enormous hurdle of karma and then to understand the way to the path of righteousness for the sake of attaining the highest end of self-realisation.

(1) Karma and Rebirth are the basic concepts, which have been woven in the very texture of Indian life. "The common basis of all the religious systems of India is the dogma of retribution, causality of the deed (karma) and conditioned by the beginningless change of existences following one another."¹ Happiness and misery are distributed in unequal ways. Bad men are happy, good men are miserable. The book of Job presents the life of Job which is at once noble and poignantly miserable. Of all the solutions suggested for explaining this pathetic inequality, the karma theory comes nearer to logical adequacy and psychological satisfaction.

As man sows, so does he reap. Our actions have the reaction and effects. These effects cannot be destroyed. They have to be experienced and exhausted. If we cannot exhaust the effects of these actions and the fruits of actions in one life, it has to be done in the chain of lives. This is the burden of the song in the karma theory. "O, Gautama," said Mahāvira, "just as a sprout has a seed for its *hetu*, as there is *hetu* for happiness and misery, since it is a *kārya*. That *hetu* is the karma."²

The doctrine of karma is one of the most significant tenets of Indian thought. It has profoundly influenced the life and thought of the people in India. It has become the logical prius of all Indian thought.³ The Jainas have given an elaborate and scientific study of the karma theory, although karma theory has

1. Glasenapp: *Immortality and Salvation in Indian Religions*, (Trans. E. F. J. Payne, Shushila Gupta, 1964, pp. 25).
2. *Videśāvātyaka Bhāṣya*: *Gaṇadharavāda*: 161I-12. Commentary.
3. Cave (Sidney): *Living Religions of the East*. pp. 31.

been generally accepted in all systems of Indian philosophy, except the Cārvāka.

The concept of karma must have existed atleast a thousand years before the beginning of the Christian era.⁴ The Indian view of karma is predominantly non-Aryan and it was prevalent as a national solution for explaining the inequalities.⁵ The Jainas have developed the theory of karma in detail on the realistic pattern, and have presented the principles of karma in material terms in the sense of karma as particles of fine matter. The Jaina conception of karma must have been completely developed after a thousand years of Mahāvira's *nirvāṇa*. The *Sthānāṅga*, *Uttarādhyayana* and *Bhagavati sūtra* have presented the general outline of the karma theory. But later in *Karma-granīha*, *Pāñcasangraha* and *Karma-prakṛti* details of the karma theory have been worked out. *Gommatasāra-karma-kāṇḍa* has given fabulous mathematical calculations regarding the types of karma and the operation of karma. In working out the details we find there have been two schools of thought: (1) Āgamic school and (2) Karmagranthika. We shall restrict our discussion to the presentation of karma theory in the Āgamic tradition.

Jainism is dualistic. The universe is constituted of the fundamental principle of *jīva* and *ajīva*. From the noumenal point of view, *jīva* is pure and perfect. It is simple and it is characterised by the hormic energy, 'upayoga'.⁶ But from the phenomenal point of view, *jīva* is active. The activity of *jīva* is due to its contact with the *ajīva*. This is *yoga* and *yoga* brings its after-effects in the form of karmic particles which veil the real nature of the soul. The souls are contaminated by karmic particles, and the souls get involved in the wheel of *samsāra*. It is difficult to say how the pure and immaterial soul gets polluted by the material karma. However, analogical explanation have been given;

4. Glasenapp: *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy*, (1942. German edition), Preface to the German edition).
5. Ninian Smart: *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, (Allen Unwin), 1964, pp. 163.
6. *Dravyasaṅgraha*: 2.

Just as the cloth soaked in oil absorbs dust particles, so also the soul due to its activity is involved in this life, gets contaminated with karmic particles. In this case the pure soul in its real nature is not really affected. It is the empirical individual due to the contact with the object gets itself involved in the karmic tangle. The sense experience and the senses like *sparsa*, *rasa*, *gandha*, *rūpa* and *śabda* are not immaterial and the sense organs which receive the stimulations are also *mūrti*.⁷ The Jainas considered mind to be also constituted of fine particles of matter which are called *manovarganās*. In this sense the experience of the pleasure and pain are also *mūrti* and karmic particles which bring about the experiences are also *mūrti*. Therefore, that which has form comes in contact with that which has also form. The *mūrti* binds the *mūrti*. The immaterial soul only creates occasion for such contacts. It is only instrumental (*avakāśarūpa*) for the karmic obscuration.⁸ It is suggested that *pudgala* and Ātman can be distinguished into three forms: (1) Pure Ātman which is in the state of perfection, (2) Pure *pudgala* (pure matter), (3) The contact of the Ātman and the *pudgala*. This is the state of the Ātman which is in the wheel of *samsāra*. The involvement of the Ātman with the karma has been considered to be beginningless and the ātman contaminated with karma may be described as *mūrti ātman* (having form). Therefore, the ātman has been described as *arūpi jīva* and *rūpi jīva*. *Arupi jīva* is the *mukta jīva* while *samsāri jīva* is *rūpi jīva*. *Samsāri jīva* is active in this world and due to this activity it accumulates karma.⁹ For instance, with the rise of *mohaniya karma*, emotional upset of attachment and hatred are born and due to this expression of the emotional set, the karmic bondage occurs.¹⁰ But in the case of

7. *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 141.

“Jamhā kammassa phalam, visayam phasehim bhunjade piyayam I
Jiveṇa suham dukkham, tamhā kammāṇi muttāṇi” II

8. *Pancāstikāyasāra*: 142.

“Mutto kāsadi muutam, mutto mutteṇa bandhamapuhavadi I
Jivo mutti virahido gabida tetedim uggahadi...” II

9. *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 1, 292.

10. *Bhagavati*: 9.

those *jivas* who are free from passions, get involved in the *shubhakarma* only.¹¹

Gautama asked Mahāvira, "Bhagavan, is the *jīva* which is miserable affected by misery or the *jīva* which is not afflicted by misery gets affected by misery?" Mahāvira replied that the *jīva* afflicted by sorrow is affected by sorrow and the *jīva* which is free from the affliction of sorrow is not affected by sorrow. The *jīva* which is steeped in sorrow gets affected by the contact of sorrow and the affliction of the mental states bringing sorrow. But the *jīva* which is free from sorrow is non-attached.¹² Gautama asked a further question: "Bhagavan, who binds the soul with the karma—self controlled or one without self-control or the one who is partially self-controlled? Mahāvira replied, "all the *jivas*, self-controlled, partially self-controlled or the one without self-control are affected by the karmas. In the case of the self-controlled, the auspicious karmas affect the soul. The physical nature of the karma has been very much asserted in Jainism and nowhere has this fact been emphasised.¹³ A moral fact produces a psycho-physical quality. It is real and not merely symbolic. It affects the soul in its physical nature.¹⁴ This point of view has been worked out in detail with mathematical schemata in the *karma grāntha*.

The Jaina tradition distinguishes two aspects of karma: (1) The physical aspect (*Dravyakarma*), (2) The psychic aspect (*bhāva-karma*). The physical aspects comprise the particles of karma (*karma pudgala*) accuring into the soul and polluting it. The psychic aspect is primarily concerned with mental states and events. They are like mental traces of actions, like the mnemonic traces which remain long after the conscious state of experience vanish. The distinction between the *dravyakarma* and the *bhāva-*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Bhagavati*: 7, 1, 266.

13. Glasenapp: *The Doctrine of Karma in Jaina Philosophy*, (Forward by Zimmerman).

14. *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 1, 282; *Bhagavati*: 9.

karma has a great psychological significance, as it emphasises the subtle relation between mind and body.

Eight types of *karma* have been distinguished: (1) *Jñānā-varṇiya karma*, (2) *Darśanā-varṇiya karma*, (3) *Vedaniya karma*, (4) *Mohaniya karma*, (5) *Āyu karma*, (6) *Nāma karma*, (7) *Gotra karma*, (8) *Antarāya karma*.¹⁶ *Jñānāvarapa*, *Darśanāvarapa*, *Mohaniya* and *Antarāya karma* are considered to be *Ghātikarmas*. Because they obscure the capacity of the soul for knowledge and activity.¹⁸ *Vedaniya*, *Āyu*, *Nāma* and *Gōtra* karmas do not obscure the capacity of the soul. Therefore, they are called *aghātikarmas*.¹⁷ The *ghātikarmas* obstruct the inherent capacity and activity of the soul, while *aghātikarmas* do not obstruct but still they hang as the weight of matter making it difficult for the soul to transcend the limitations of the obstacles of *karma*. *Jñānāvarapa karma* is of five types: based on the five types of knowledge of

15. (a) *Uttaradhyayana*: 33, 2-3.

“Nāṇassāvaraṇijjam, dāmsaṇāvaraṇam taḥā I
Veyāṇijjam taḥā moham, āukkammam taheva. II
Nāmakammam ca goyam ca, antarāyam taheva ya I
Evameyāim kammaim, attheva u samasayo” II

(b) *Sthānāṅga*: 8, 3, 596.

(c) *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 1,

(d) *Bhagavati sataka*: 6, Udde. 9. pp. 553.

(e) *Tattvārthasūtra*: 8, 5.

(f) *Prathama karmagrantha*: gatha. 3.

(g) *Pancasamgraha*: 2-2.

16. (a) *Pancādhyāyi*: 2, 998.

“Tatra ghātini catvāri, karmānya nvartha samjayayah I
Ghātakatvād guṇānāmhi jivasyaivati vāksmṛtiḥ” II

(b) *Gommatasāra*—*Karmakānda*: 9.

“Āvaraṇamohaviggham, ghādi jīvagunnattādo” I

17. (a) *Gommatasāra*—*Karmakānda*: 9.

“Āvaraṇamohaviggham, ghādi jīvaguṇaghadaṇattādo” I

(b) *Pancādhyāyi*: 2, 998.

“Tatra ghātini catvāri, karmāṇyanvarthasamjñaya I
Ghātakatvāguṇānām hi jivasyaiveti vāksmṛtiḥ” II

mati, *śruti*, *avadhi*, *manahparyāya* and *kevala*.¹⁸ We have also seen that *upayoga* is the characteristic of the soul and it is expressed in the form of *darśana* and *jñāna*.¹⁹ Therefore, *darśanavarṇiya* will be a karma as much obstructive as *jñānavarṇiya karma*. *Darśanavarṇiya karma* is of four types based on the four forms of *darśana*: *Cakṣu darśana*, *Acakṣu darśana*, *avadhi darśana* and *manahparyāya darśana*.²⁰ *Jñānāvaraṇa karma* can also be distinguished into two forms: like *sarvaghāti* (all—obscuring) and *deśaghāti* (with partial obscuration). The first four forms of *jñānāvaraṇa karma* are *Darśanavarṇiya karma deśaghāti* while *kevala jñānāvaraṇa karma* is *sarvaghāti*. In the *kevala jñānāvaraṇa karma* there is total obscuration in the case of the empirical individual, and unless the physical and moral discipline reaches a higher stage it would not be possible to clear the obscuration of the *kevala jñāna*. However, *kevala jñāna* shines with splendour just like the sunshine comes out, even though it is covered by dark clouds.²¹ *Vedaniya karma* obscures the inherent qualities of

18. (a) *Uttarādhyayana*: 33, 4.

“Naṇāvaraṇam pancaviham, suyam ābhiṇibohiyam I
Obināpam ca taiyam maṇanāpam ca kevalam” II

(b) *Prajnāpanā*: 23, 2.

(c) *Sthānāṅga*: 5, 464.

(d) *Tattvārthasūtra*: 8, 6, 7.

19. (a) *Uttarādhyayana*: 28, 10.

“Jivo uvaoga lakkhaṇo” I

(b) *Niyamasāra*: 10.

“Jivo uvaogamao, uvaogo nāṇadaṇīṣaṇo hoī” I

20. *Sthānāṅga*: 2, 4, 105.

“Naṇāvaraṇijje kamme duvihe...
desanāṇāvaraṇijje ceva savvaṇāṇāvaraṇijje ceva” I

21. *Sthānāṅga*: 2, 4, 105—tika.

“Deśah—jñānasyābhinibodhikādimavṛṇotiti deśajñānāvaraṇiyam, sarva jñānam—kevalākhyamāvṛṇotiti sarvajñānāvaraṇijam, kevalāvaraṇam hi adityakalpasya kevalajñānarūpasya Jivasyācehādakatayā sāndrameghavṛṇda kalpamiti tatsarvajñānāvaraṇam I

Matyādyāvaraṇam tu ghanaticchādītadityeṣatprabhākalpasya kevalajñāna—deśasya kaṭakuṭyādi rūpāvaraṇatulyamiti deśvaraṇamiti” I

(b) *Sthānāṅga*: *Samavāyāṅga*: Edt. Dalsukh Malvāṇia pp. 94-95.

the soul. Due to this karma the soul experiences pleasure and pain. It is also of two types: *Sātavedaniya* which is responsible for experiencing pleasures. *Asātāvedaniya* is responsible for the physical and mental pain.²² A beautiful analogical description of the distinction between the *sātāvedaniya* and *asātāvedaniya* has been given in the *sthānāṅga*.²³ Just as a sharp sword is plastered with honey and the act of licking the honey and the consequent pleasure is compared with the *sātāvedaniya karma* while during the act of licking one is likely to cut his tongue that would be *asātāvedaniya karma*. Further distinction has been made in the *sātāvedaniya* and *asātāvedaniya karma* and eight types of each of these have been mentioned.²⁴

The *mohaniya karma* deludes the soul and it is supposed to be more powerful than other karmas. In this, the pure nature of the soul has been made to feel astray and the perversity of outlook develops. It is compared to the drunken state of man wherein he loses the balance of his mind and the capacity of

(c) *Nandisūtra* : 43.

“Savva jīvāṇam pi ya ḥam akkharassa
aṇanatabhāgo ḥiccu ghādīo havai I
Jai puṇa so vi ḥavarījjā ṭeṇam jivo ajivattam pāvejjā” I

22. (a) *Uttarādhyayana* : 33, 8.

“Veyāṇiyam pi duviham dansane cavaṇe tāhā” I

(b) *Sthānāṅga* : 2, 105.

23. (a) *Sthānāṅga* : 2, 4. 105 Tīkā.

“Tathā vedyate—anubhūyata iti vedaniyam, sātam
sukham tadrūpataya vedyate yattattathā
Dirghatvam prākṛtattvāt, itarad—etadviparitam aha ca—”.
“Mahulittanisiyakaravāladhāra jihāe jārisam lihaṇam I
Tārisayam...suhaduhaupāyagam...muṇaha” II

(b) *Prathama Karmagrantha* : 12.

“Mahulittakhaggadhārālihaṇam va duhā u veyāṇiyam”

24. (a) *Sthānāṅga* : 8, 488.

(b) *Prajñāpanā* : 23, 3.

(c) *Prajñāpanā* : 23, 3, 15.

“Asāyavedanijje nam bhante I—Kamme katividhe paṇṇatte?
Goyamā I, Aṭṭhavidhe pannatte tam jahā—amanuṇṇa saddā,
jāva kāyaduhaya” I

describination.²⁵ *Mohaniya karma* is of two types: (1) *Darśana mohaniya* and (2) *Cāritra mohaniya*.²⁶ *Darśana mohaniya* is again divided into three types like (a) *Samyaktva mohaniya* (b) *Mithyātva mohaniya* and (c) *Miśra mohaniya*.²⁷ *Cāritra mohaniya* can be considered into two types as *kaśāya mohaniya* and (2) *Nokaśāya mohaniya*.²⁸

Āyukarma is that karmic matter which determines the age of an individual *jiva*. This karma makes an individual live the duration of life which is fixed due to the karma and when the karma is exhausted the *jiva* meets death.²⁹ On the basis of the distinction of the four states of existence, *Āyu karma* has been distinguished into four types like (1) *Narakāyu*, (2) *Tiryān-Āyu*, (3) *Manuṣya-Āyu* and (4) *Devāyu*.³⁰

25. (a) *Prathama Karmagrantha*: gāthā 13.
 “Majjam va mohaṇiyam—”

(b) *Sthānāṅga* : 1, 4, 105—Tīkā.
 “Jaha majjapāṇamūḍho loe puriso paravvaso hoi I
 Taha mohena—vimūḍho jivo u paravvaso hoi” II

26. (a) *Gommaṭasāra* : Karmakāṇḍa—21.
 (b) *Uttarādhyayana* : 33, 8.
 “Mohanijjam pi duviham, dāmsaṇe caraṇe tahā” I
 (c) *Sthānāṅga* : 2, 4, 105,
 (d) *Prajñāpanā* : 23, 2.

27. (a) *Sthānāṅga* : 2, 184.
 (b) *Uttarādhyayana* : 33, 9.
 “Sammattam ceva micchattam, sammāmicchattameva ya I
 Eyāo tiini payaṭio, mohanijjassa damsāṇe” II

28. (a) *Uttarādhyayana* : 31, 10.
 “Carittamohaṇam kammam, duviham tam viyāhiyam I
 Kasāyamohaṇijjam tu nokasāyam taheva ya” II

29. (a) *Tattvārtha-rāṭavārṭika* : 8, 10-2.
 (b) *Prajñāpanā* : 23, 1.

30. (a) *Tattvasāhitya Saṅgraha* with *Vṛtti*, *Navatattvaprakarana* 74 (as quoted by Devendra Muni Shastri in his *Jaina Darśanasvarūpa* our *Visleṣana* (Hindi) Taraka Guru Jaina Granthamala, 1975—pp. 471.
 “Paṭapādiḥāraśi majjahadacittakulāla bhaṭṭagārīṇam I
 Jaha eesim bhāvā kammāpi vi jāna taha bhāvā” II
 (b) *Gommaṭasāra* : Karmakāṇḍa—11.
 “Jivāssa avatthāṇam karedi sū haṭṭivva ṣaram” I

Nāmakarma determines the status and the conditions of the individual *jīva* in this life.⁸¹ *Nāmakarma* has been distinguished into two types as *śubhanāma* and *asubhanāma*. Numerous distinctions have been made in the *nāmakarma* describing the various physical and mental states determined by the *nāmakarma*. *Prajñāpanā*⁸² and *Gommaṭasāra*⁸³ have mentioned ninety-three distinctions in the *nāmakarma* and in the consequent effects of karma, one hundred and three types of karma have been mentioned.

Gotrakarma determines the individual status concerning the high or the low status and also the family status of the *jīva*. Due to this karma the individual is born in particular types of family with particular status in society.⁸⁴ The *gotrakarma* has been distinguished into two forms as *Uccagotrā* and *Nicagotrā*.⁸⁵

The distinction between the types of karma is based on the types of *mulaaprakṛti* and a number of *uttaraprakṛtis*.

The influx of karma affects the soul in various forms and produces certain types of "Auro" or Colouration about it. This

(c) *Prathama Karmagrantha*: 23.

"Suranaratirinarayaū haḍisārisam" I

(d) *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 1.

"Goyamā, Āyussa ram kammassa jiveṇam baddhassa
Jāva cauvihe aṇubhāve pannoṭte—tam jahāteraiyaute, tiriyaute,
maṇuyāute, devāuye" I

(e) *Uttarādhyayana*: 33, 12.

"Neraiyatirikkhāum, maṇussāum taheva ya I

Devāuyam cauttham tu, āum kammam cauviham" II

31. (a) *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 1, 288. *Tikā*.

"Namayati—gatyādiparyayātubhavanam prati pravayaṇati jivamiti

(b) *Sthānāṅga*: 2, 4, 105. *Tikā*.

"nāma" I

"Vicitraparyayairnamayati—pariṇamayati yajjivam tannāma" I

32. *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 2, 293.

33. *Gommaṭasāra*: *Karmakāṇḍa*: 22.

34: *Prajñāpanā*: 23, 1, 288. *Tikā*.

"Yaddā karmaṇospādānavivakṣā, gūyate—śabdtate uccāvacaiḥ
sabdairātmā yasmāt karmanāḥ" I

35. *Uttarādhyayana*: 33, 14.

"Goyam kammam tu duviham, uccam niyam ca abiyam
Uccam aṭṭhaviham boi, evam niyam pi abiyam"

colouration is the *lesya*. But this colouration does not affect the soul in its pure form. The colour of the reflection does not belong to the soul. It is primarily connected with accretion of karmic matter. *Lesya* has been considered as of two types: (1) *Dravya lesya* and *Bhāva lesya*. *Dravya lesya* refers to a karmic material affecting the organism. *Bhāvalesya* refers to the psychic condition affecting the organism and thereby radiating colour, which may be called transcendental colouration. Six *lesyas* have been mentioned: (1) Black (*Kṛṣṇa*), (2) blue (*Nila*), (3) Dove gray (*Kapota*), (4) Yellow (*Pita*) (5) Pink (*Padma*) and (6) White (*Sukla*). For instance, a man who is wicked and cruel gets the black *lesya*. A man who is affected by anger and envy and who loves pleasures gets the blue *lesya*. One who is base and dishonest has grey. On the contrary, a well disciplined man develops red *lesya*. One who has subdued passions has yellow. One who is engrossed in meditation of the dharma and truth has the white *lesya*. But the fully liberated souls are without *lesya*.⁸⁶

We may add a note on the *Antarāya karma* which is relevant for the understanding of the *karma bandha* and the obstruction of activity which is due to the karmic particles. *Antarāya karma* obstructs the energy of the soul and impedes its activity towards self-realisation. It creates a sort of sluggishness in the pursuit of spiritual activity. This has been compared to the treasury officer of the king. The king awards presents to some of his subjects. But in executing the awards the treasury officer unnecessarily delays.⁸⁷ The consequences of the operations of *antarāya karma* may be considered in five forms: (1) *Dāna antarāya*, (2) *Lābha antarāya*, (3) *Bhoga antarāya*, (4) *Upabhoga antarāya* and (5) *Virya antarāya karma*. *Āntarāya karma* is also considered to be of two types: (1) *Pratyutpanna vināśi antarāya karma* by which the objects made available are destroyed. (2) *Pihita Āgāmipatha antarāya karma* in which the objects which [are likely to be available in future will not be obtained.⁸⁸ The duration of

36. *Uttarādhyayana sūtra*: Lect. XXXIV. SBE. Vol. II Footnote.

37. *Sthānāṅga*: 2, 4 105.

38. *Ibid.*:

antarāya karma varies from one *antarmuhūrta* to crores and crores of *Sāgaropama* years.³⁹

The influx of karmic matter into the soul is incessantly due to the activities (*yoga*) of the soul. The bondage of the soul with reference to the volume of karmic matter (*Prakṛti bandha*) and the space of the soul occupied by the karmic particles (*Pradesabandha*). These two types of *bandha* determine the nature and the type of bondage like *Jñānāvaraṇiya* and *darśanāvaraṇiya karma bandha*. In the Āgamas, it has been suggested that in the case of one-sensed organisms, the karmic flow is from six directions. However, the receptions of the karma into the soul is possible, in these cases, from three or four sources.⁴⁰ But this limitation regarding *kṣetra* varies with reference to the number of sense organs that the organism possess.

The karmic matter undergoes different processes due to its quantitative aspects. The karmic particles may be found together into different categories (*karma vargana*) and are bound together into varying degrees of aggregates (*skhanda*). *Jiva* assimilates karmic matter within its own *pradeśa*, just as fire sets fire to inflammable material lying within its reach. The karmic matter undergoes different processes due to the various conditions of activity. These processes have sometimes been classified into eleven types and sometimes into eight types. The eight types of karmic processes being mentioned as (1) *bandha* which is responsible for the bondage. (2) *sankramana*—it is transformation of one type of karma into another type of karma in respect of its nature *prakṛti*, duration (*sthiti*), intensity (*anubhāga*) and extension

39. *Uttarādhyayana* : 33, 10.

40. (a) *Uttarādhyayana* : 32, 18.

“Savvajivāpā kammam tu, sangahe cchaddisāgayaṁ I
Savvesu vi paesu savvam savveṇa baddhagam”. II

(b) *Bhagavati* : 17: 4.

Also refer to.

Viśesāvṣyaka-bhāṣya : gāthā 1941 part II pp. 117.

“Geṇhati tajjogam eiya reṇum puriso jahā kayabhangō I
Egakkhetṭopagāḍham jivo savvappaesehim”. II

(*pradeśa*).⁴¹ For instance, *asātāvedaniya karma* can be transformed into *sātāvedaniya karma*. Similarly, *samyag drṣṭi* is transformed as *mithyātva-karma* into the *samyak-mithyātva* or *samyaktva karma*. This process may be compared to the process of transformation of light energy into heat energy. But any karma cannot be transformed into any other karma. Transformation is possible between the sub-types of a particular type of karma. (3) *Udvartana* and (4) *Apavartana* are processes which are concerned with the transformation of the karmic processes with reference to the duration and the intensity of karmic fruition. *Udvartana* is increased realisation and *Apavartana* is decreased realisation of the duration and intensity of the karmic experience. The increased realization of *Āyu karma*, however, is not possible with all beings. (5) *Udirāpa* is the premature realisation of the fruition of karma. It is possible that in order to get premature realisation of the karmic effect it is necessary that there should be some *abādhākāla* which refers to the period of potentiality or non-production. (6) *Upasamana* has reference to this subsidence of the karmic effect. It is a process by which the rise, premature fruition and other processes are operating. The soul gets a glimpse of reality when *mohaniya karma* is held up. Then it gets the inherent love of truth. The subsidence of karma will ordinarily be temporary, because in the end it has to exhaust itself completely before it attains the final goal. Then, there is the combined process of subsidence and destruction of karma. (7) *Nikacita* is a process in which *udvartana*, *apavartana*, *sankramana* and *udirāpa* are absent. This state of the soul has also a reference to *prakṛti*, *sthiti*, *anubhāga* and *pradeśa* of the karmic matter.⁴² (8) *Nidhātti* is a process by which karma is made incapable of all processes except *udvartana* and *apavartana*. Under certain conditions the karmic particles are so intimately glued to the soul that it becomes impossible to affect them in any way except by *advartana* and *apavartana*.⁴³

41. *Sthānāṅga* : 4, 216.

42. *Sthānāṅga* : 4, 296.

43. *Prajñāpanā* : 23, 2, 21-29.

The ultimate end of every being is to seek freedom from the miseries of life and to seek deliverance. We have to free ourselves from the bondage of karma and this process of freedom for the bondage of karma, as we have discussed earlier, is through the paths of *samvara* and *nirjarā*. *Samyārā* is to stop the influx of karma and *nirjarā* is to remove the accumulated karma. Accumulated karma is removed and we reach the state of affection. The soul has inherent capacity for self-realisation. But the way to self-realisation is long and arduous. In the course of its eternal wonderings in wheel of *samsāra*, that self, sometimes, gets an indistinct vision of righteousness and feels an unconquerable urge to realise this vision. For this realisation, the soul has to go through the different stages in the spiritual development. These stages are called *Gupasthāna*. They are linked with the processes of the subsidence and destruction of karmic veil. There are fourteen stages of spiritual development. In these stages, the self, step by step enters into higher levels of experiences and reaches the stage of spiritual development in a graduated way. In the first stage of *gupasthana* called *mithyādṛṣṭi*, we are suffering from the perversity of outlook. We easily accept the wrong beliefs caused by the *mithyātva* karma. But we are not entirely bereft of an indistinct vision of the right, although due to perversity of attitude we do not relish the truth, just as a man suffering from fever has no taste for sugarcane.⁴⁴ The next stage is called *sāsvādana samyag-dṛṣṭi*. It is a halting stage in which one gets a vision of truth but is likely to fall back on false-hood due to the affection of passions (*kaṣāya*). In the third stage of *samyag-mithyādṛṣṭi* we get a mixed attitude of right and wrong beliefs. In this we have neither a desire to have true belief nor a desire to remain in ignorance, just like mixing of curds and treacle.⁴⁵ This is also a transitional stage and then we get *samyagdṛṣṭi* and in this we have glimpse of truth. In these four stages of self-realisation we have come to the vision of truth. It is knowledge

44. *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa* : 17.

45. *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa* : 22.

“Dahiguḍamiva vāmissam pahubhāvam neva kāridum sakkam I
Evam missayabhāvo sammānicchottipādavvo ”. II

but still we have not got the supporting capacity for right effort (*Samyag-Cāritra*). In my book, *Jaina view of Life*, I have compared these four stages to the mental conditions of the prisoners facing the well in the parable of cave in Plato's *Republic*.⁴⁶

With the next stage of *Desaviratasamyag-dṛṣṭi* moral efforts enter the field. In this we are aware of the practice of virtues. But full practice of virtues is not possible, because there is a possibility of the influence of passions.⁴⁷ In the next stage, the moral efforts takes a definite shape, although it is not always successful. A person with a glimpse of truth makes effort to develop self-control. But in the next stage further, the obstacles are removed and the right attitude becomes firm. In the fifth stage, a person has the glimpse of the truth and he tries to develop self control. That stage is called *Desavirata samyagdṛṣṭi*. In the sixth stage the obstacles like wavering self-control are removed and the practice of virtue becomes more steady. But even in this stage, the moral and the spiritual struggles are not fully successful, because the inertia (*pramāda*) is responsible for the failure to realise full self-control.⁴⁸ In the next stage these difficulties in the practice of virtue are gradually being removed and one is able to practice the five vows with greater confidence. The *pramāda* is overcome and therefore this stage is called *apramattasamyata*. From the eighth to the tenth stage there is greater self-control and greater moral activity. The 9th stage is called *apūrvakarapa* in which the self attains special purification, and is capable of reducing the intensity and the duration of the karma. The process of *apūrvakarapa* operates in this stage.⁴⁹ The 9th stage is called *anivṛtti-bādara-samparāya*. This is the process of

46. Kalghatgi (T. G.), *Jaina View of Life* : pp. 133-135.

47. *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa* : 30 and Commentary

“Pacchakkāṇudayādo samjamabhāvo na hodi pavarim tu I
thovavado hodi tado desavado hodi pancamaṇo”.

48. *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa* : 33.

“Vattāvattapamāde jo vasai pamattasamjado hodi I
Sayalaguṇasilakalio mahavvai cittatāyaraṇo”.

49. *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa* : 48, 49.

anivṛttikarana which operates in this stage and is possible for the self to progress in the path of self-realisation in the direction of the suppression (*upasama*) or the destruction (*Kṣaya*) of the karma. The self may be affected in this stage by gross passions to some extent. Therefore, it is called *bādara-samparāya*. Next higher stage is the *sūkṣma-samparāya*.⁵⁰ In this, the self experiences slight touches of greed but except for such slight disturbances, the self can go in the direction of subsidences and destruction of karma. In this stage, the self has advanced fairly well and it is well established and perfect practice of moral life is possible, although slight disturbances of passion like that of greed are possible.

The eleventh stage is called *upasāntamoha* in which even the slightest disturbances due to the passion of greed are overcome. And all such disturbances are suppressed. One is free from all the passions, but the passions are not altogether destroyed. They remain suppressed due to moral effort and therefore, one is not altogether free from the enveloping influence of karmas except the deluding karma. This stage is also called *chadmastha* stage.

There remains the stage where the destruction of karmas would be the next process. One who goes the way of suppressing the karmas gradually destroys the deluding karmas. Then the soul goes from the stage of *upasāntamoha* to the next stage of *kṣeena moha* or *kṣeena kaṣāya*. In this there is the annihilation of karma and all the passions disappear. The soul is now free from all the *ghāti* karmas.

When the *ghāti* karmas are removed, one reaches the thirteenth stage of *sayoga kevali*. The conditions of bondage like *mithyātva*, *pramāda* and passions are no longer operative. One is free from such bondage. However, the other conditions like the bondage of activity still remain. It is not free from yoga although the stage has reached the *kevalin's* state. Therefore, it is called *sayoga*

50. *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa*: 59.

"dhudakosumbhuyavattham hodi jaha suhamarīyasamjuttam I
Evam subamakasāo suhamasarāgotti ṣādavyo".

kevali. The persons still go through the three-fold activities of body, speech and mind. But there is no influx of karma. In this stage, we find the omniscient beings like the *Tirthāṅkaras*, the *Gaṇadharas* and the *Sāmanya kevalins*. They attain enlightenment, but they still live in the world preaching the truth that they have experienced. This stage has been compared to the *jīvanmukta* stage described by the other systems of Indian philosophy.⁵¹

The final stage of self-realisation is the stage of *ayoga kevalin*. Before entering into the final stage of absolute purity and liberation, the soul appears to prepare itself for the stoppage of all activity, both gross and subtle. Then the soul enters the third stage of *sukla dhyāna* which is infallible and which leads to the final liberation. This is the highest stage of *sukla dhyāna*. When the remaining karmas, are eliminated the state of highest perfection clears all the karmas and it is free from the karmic dust.⁵² This final liberation is only possible in the human existence because it is only for human beings that they can go through the moral and the spiritual efforts for the attainment of perfection.⁵³

So far, we have studied the nature and the process of karmic activity. Several objections have been raised regarding the validity of the karma theory, but karma theory has been accepted by all systems of Indian philosophy as a possible solution for the inequality in life. I have discussed these problems in my book, *Karma and rebirth*.⁵⁴ For a scientific explanation of the karma theory we may refer to J. C. Jung's remarks regarding the collective and the racial unconscious. Jung says that the collective and the racial unconscious may be compared to the karma theory. The karma aspect is essential to the deeper understanding of the

51. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*, (Karnatak University, Dharwar—1961) pp. 163.

52. *Dhyānāśataka* : 82.

Also refer: *Gommaṭasāra—Jivakāṇḍa* : 62-65.

53. *Abhidhāna Rājendra* : Vol. III—Guṇasthāna.

54. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Karma and Rebirth* (L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad) 1973.

nature of an archetype.⁵⁵ Jung further states: "had he developed the archetypes of the collected unconscious, he would have 'preached doctrine karma, the store-house of the physical and psychical effects of the past.'⁵⁶ Karma theory is, infact, a striking answer to the 'fathomless injustice to the nature of things' and it appeals 'to the over-powering sense of the necessity of justice'. 'The conception of an all-controlling law of natural distribution which links together the successive earth lives of each individual soul, both satisfied my sense of justice and throws light on the problem of seemingly unmerited suffering'.⁵⁷ Apart from the logical and metaphysical implications of the karma theory, we can say that karma is a self-evident principle which is also experienced by the seers. And, "O Agnibhūti, karma is *pratyakṣa* to me the omniscient being, just as your doubt is *pratyakṣa* to me".⁵⁸

B. Jaina Ethical Doctrines:

We have so far covered a long distance to the stage of self-realisation—that is the highest end of perfection, i.e. the spiritual perfection. But perfection is not possible unless we stand firm and are rooted on the solid foundation of the moral life in this world. Before we learn to fly, we must learn to walk on this earth. Before we give to "God" what is God's we have to give Caeser what is Caeser's. We have first to live a good life in this world and then can hope for the perfection in the other world. For the Jainas, as for others in India, spiritual excellence is the highest end. A good man can reach this excellence by his efforts. There is no short cut to the attainment of spiritual excellence. The Jainas gave equal emphasis on *samyag-cāritra* (right conduct), *samyag-darsana* (right intuition) and *samyag-jñāna* (right knowledge). In this sense, the Jaina approach to life is not negative. The Jaina *weltanschauung* is melioristic. Moral life,

55. Jung (J. C.): *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (Personal and Collective or Transcendental Unconscious) pp. 76 Footnote.

56. Radhakrishnan (S): *Indian Philosophy*: Vol. I (Allen Unwin 1941.) pp. 109-110.

57. Warren (H. C.): *Buddhism in Translations*: (1922) pp. 48.

58. *Viśeṣāvāsyaka-bhāṣya*: Gaṇadharavāda—1611-1612.

therefore, is important as the pathway to perfection. Ethics for the Jaina is working in righteousness for all the days in one's life. There are no holidays for morality. *Samyag-cāritra* is an important step in the pathway to self-realisation. The characteristics of *samyaktya* have been mentioned in the Jaina *yoga*.⁵⁹ They are : (1) *Samvega* (spiritual carving), (2) *sama* (reducing the passions), (3) *Nirveda* (disgust for sense pleasure), (4) *Bhakti* (devotion), (5) *Anakampa* (compassion), (6) *Nindā* (remorse for the evil acts of others), (7) *Garha* (repentence) and (8) *Vātsalya* (Loving kindness).

Samyag-cāritra has been distinguished into two types : (1) *Sakala* (complete) and (2) *Vikala* (partial). *Sakala cāritra* is the rigorous practice of *dharma* and it is to be adopted by those who have renounced the world. It is the way of the ascetics. It is *muni dharma*. *Vikala cāritra* is less rigorous and it is the way of the householder, the citizen. It is *śravaka dharma*. The muni has to be rigorous in the practice of virtues, while moderations must be the keynote of the citizen. It is rooted in compromise.⁶⁰

Muni dharma aims at seeking salvation through the rigorous practice of virtues like (1) The five *vratas*. These *vratas* are called *Mahāvratas*. There is a discussion between Kesi the disciple of Pārśva and Gautama the disciple of Mahāvira regarding the addition of the fifth *vrata* by Mahāvira.⁶¹ Later it is suggested that abstinence from taking food at night (*rāi-bhoyaṇāo veramapam*) was added with the main intention of avoiding injury to the living beings in the dark. Of the five *vratas*, *Ahimsā vrata* (non-violence) is the most important *vrata*. Jainas have given primary importance to the doctrine of non-violence. The doctrine of non-violence is primarily based on the animistic conception of the universe. The *jivas* are possessed of *prāṇas*. One should avoid harming the *jīva* as it would destroy the *prāṇas*. We should avoid injury to the living beings. Violence caused to the living

59. Schubring (W.) *Die Lehre der Jainas*, Berlin 1935 : pp. 180-186 Trans. Wolfgang Beurlen (Banarasidas) 1962. pp. 298-300.

60. *Ibid*, p. 302.

61. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* : 15.1 (S. B. E. Vol. ILV).

organism due to carelessness and negligence (*pramattiyoga*) and actuated by passions like pride and prejudice, attachment and hatred has to be avoided. Due to negligence, injury is caused and such injury brings sin. On the contrary a careful and a pious man who is not disturbed by passions and who is kind towards animals will not suffer the sin of violence, even if, by accident, injury is caused to life.⁶² The other four *vratas* are *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmācārya* and *aparigraha*. In addition to the *mahāvratas*, the monk has to practice the control of the five senses, six *āvaśyakas* and other practices, the five *samitis* and avoiding twenty-two *pariṣah*. The practice of vows and other injunctions has to be carefully done by the ascetics and the practice is three-fold: by mind, body and speech. The infraction of the practice of vows and other injunctions is also three-fold: by one self, by getting others, to commit violation and by acquiescing in the act of violation. The monk should have twenty-eight *mūla gunās* (basic qualities) as described in *mūlācāra*.⁶³ The *Daśavaikālika sūtra* gives the description of the essential qualities required of a monk. He is self-controlled. He has no desires nor attachments. He wanders about as a beggar. He should live as a model of righteousness.⁶⁴ Then he will be free from the karmic matter and ultimately he reaches *mokṣa*.⁶⁵ A monk has also to comply with the rules of *Yati* as regards the ascetic practices and postures. In all these he has to be thoroughly acquainted with the *samitis* and *guptis*.⁶⁶

But all cannot renounce the world, nor is it desirable. Most men have to live in this world and do the daily routine of activity for the sake of doing one's duty for the practice of righteousness. Therefore, most of us are citizens who are primarily concerned with doing the social and moral responsibility. We cannot practise the *vratas* with the same rigorous discipline as the

62. *Pravacanasāra*: by Kundakundācārya 3.17.

63. *Mūlācāra*: 1-36

64. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*: 15.1 (S. B. E. Vol. XLV).

65. *Daśavaikālika-sūtra*: 10. 1-15.

66. *Sutrakṛtāṅga*: Bk. I. 14. 16 (S. B. E. XLV).

monks would do. We have to practise the *vrata* with less rigour as far as possible still without sacrificing a fundamental spirit of the *vratas*. We have always to keep in mind the social responsibilities that we have to shoulder before we enter into the path of individual spiritual realisation. Therefore, we may call this ethical code of a citizen as social ethics. The ethics of a monk is individual ethics. The social ethics is the *śrāvaka dharma* in which social good is the most important consideration. In this sense, Jainas have given a graduated ethical code from the practice of social ethics to the realization of personal perfection. Therefore, there is a spiritual synthesis of the secular and the spiritual in the structure of ethics that the Jainas have presented. And in this sense, again, we cannot consider the Jaina outlook as negative.

The ethical code of the citizen (*śrāvaka*) is twelve-fold: (a) five *vratas* which are common with the ascetics; but the practise of the *vratas* have to be less rigorous keeping in view the social responsibilities without sacrificing the spirit of righteousness and the main goal of self-realisation. The vows practised by the citizens are called *anuvratas* ie. lesser vows.

For instance, Jainas were aware of the difficulties in the rigorous practise of the *vratas* like non-violence and non-possession. The Jaina scriptures did not preach, as has been very often mis-understood, the practice of the un-qualified and abstract principle of *ahimsā* to the extent of the ridiculous. The right understanding of the word *himsā* would clear this mis-understanding. *Himsā* is injury or violence caused to the living organism due to carelessness and negligence and actuated by passions like prejudice and pride and attachment and hatred.⁶⁷ In the *Yesastilaka*, Somadeva defines *himsā* as injury to a living being through error of judgement (*pramādayogena*). The citizen is to see that he does not injure any living being as far as possible and intentionally (*sankalpath*).⁶⁸ He should be free from *sthūla-himsā* and in his case the prohibition of *himsa* begins with two-sensed organisms, because it would be impossible to practise *ahimsā* to one-sensed

67. *Pramattayogat prāpavyaparopapāgam himsā*, T. S. VIII 8.

68. *Cāritrādhikāra* : 53.

organism in the conduct of daily life. Therefore, he is exempted from this restriction.

Even in the practice of non-violence, certain forms of injury are permitted as exceptional cases. For instance, the possible injury that the minute insects suffer while ploughing by a farmer is not to be considered as *hiṃsā* bringing sin, because the farmer is doing his social duty and he does not intend injuring the tiny living beings although he is aware that many of them are injured. Similarly it is recognised as a duty of *kṣatriya* to defend the weak even with arms. It is *virodha hiṃsā*. The farmer's *hiṃsā* is *ārmbha hiṃsā*. Here, we are reminded of Gandhiji's words when he said that "violence is preferable to cowardice". A coward has no moral strength to observe non-violence. Gandhiji said that a mouse hardly forgives a cat when it allows itself to be torn to pieces by her.⁶⁹ The *Praśnayākaraṇa sūtra*⁷⁰ gives sixty names ascribed to *ahimṣā* and says that *ahimṣā* does good to all.

In the practice of *ahimṣā* by a *śrāvaka* he has to guard against some of the excessive violations of the practice of the *vrata*. We may mention a few of them: (1) *bandha*, tying up an animal, keeping it in captivity. For example, tying up of domestic animals for a long time. (2) *Vadha*—beating animals and children, although some exceptions are permitted like mild beating and pulling the ears for the sake of correction. (3) *Chaviccheda*—In this, we are likely to cause injury to the animal with sharp instruments like swords or knives. Here also the use of knife by a surgeon is permitted. (4) *Atibhārārśpana*—It refers to merciless overloading of the beasts of burden. (5) *Bhuktapāna-vyavaccheda*—It refers to making the animals suffer from hunger for no fault of theirs but due to negligence or due to anger.

Similar infractions of the different *vratas* have also been mentioned. It is beyond the scope of this work to go into the details of the infractions of the *vratas* and their exceptions.

69. *Young India*—August 11, 1920.

70. *Praśna Vyākaraṇa Sūtra*: Ch. I, Sūtra II.

In addition to the *Apuvratas* the *śrāvaka* has to practise *gunavratas*: (1) *Digvrata* (2) *bhogopabhogparimāṇavrata* (3) *anarthadandavrata*. *Digvrata* restricts the movements in different directions. The purpose is to reduce the possibility of committing injury to a being. The *bhogopabhogparimāṇa vrata* forbids or limits one in the use of consumable goods like food and other durable articles like furniture. The *anarthadandavrata* restricts an individual from taking up certain harmful activity, professions and trades which serve no righteous purpose. Some sub-divisions of *anarthadanda vrata* have also been mentioned in the *Ratnakarāṇḍaka Śrāvākācāra* of Samantabhadra.⁷¹ Five types of *Anarthadanda* have been mentioned: (1) *apadhyāna* (evil concentration like *ārta-dhyāna* and *rudra dhyāna*; (2) *Pramādacāritra* (negligent mischief or addiction to alcoholism etc., (3) *himsāpradāna* (encouraging injury to life as in the case of supplying poison etc., (5) *Pāpopadeśa* like sinful advice. (5) *duḥ-śruti* which consists in reading *kāma-sūtra* and other sex literature, and yellow journals. In this we take pleasure in listening to slander. These are harmful because they create perverse tendency and encourage excitement of passions.⁷²

Now we come to *Siksāvrata*. A *śrāvaka* has to practice four *siksāvratas*: (1) *Sāmāyika*, (2) *Desāvakāśika*, (3) *Proṣadhopavāsa* and (4) *Atithi-samvibhāga*. *Sāmāyika* is one of the important practices of the layman. It is one of the six *āvaśyakas*. It consists in the attainment of equanimity and tranquility of mind. *Desāvakāśika* is a modification of the *Digvrata*. It restricts the movement of an individual to a limited area like restricting the individual not to go beyond village or a part thereof for a specific period varying from a *muhūrta* to a few days or a couple of months. *Proṣadhopavāsa vrata* enjoins one to fast at regular intervals in a month say on the eighth (*asṭami*) and fourteenth day (*caturdaśi*).⁷³ *Atithi-samvibhāgavarta* refers to giving due respect

71. *Ratnakarāṇḍaka Śrāvākācāra*: of Samantabhadra, iii. 31.

72. *Ratnakarāṇḍaka Śrāvākācāra*: 33 also refer *Sāgaradharmaṇīta* of Āśadbara. Bombay ed. 1917, v. 8.

73. *Tattvārtha-sūtra*: vii. 16 and *Bhāṣya* of Siddhasena.

to the guest. Specific instructions have been given regarding the qualifications of the *atithi* and the mode of giving alms (*dāna*). In giving alms one should consider the following five factors: (1) *pātra* (the recipient), (2) *dātr* (giver), (3) *dātavya* (the object given), (4) *dāna vidhi* (manner of giving, and (5) *danaphala* (the result of giving alms).⁷⁴

We have briefly considered the twelve injunctions that a layman or a citizen has to follow for living a righteous life. A layman who would like to go in higher stages of spiritual development will have to practice eleven stages of moral and spiritual practices resulting from the careful observations of twelve *vratas*. The eleven stages of moral and spiritual practices are called *pratimas*.⁷⁵ Schubring says "Horizontally expanded as it were, these obligations are projected in the vertical by the ladder of the eleven *uvāsaga-pādima*".⁷⁶ The eleven *pratimas* are the injunctions or the ways conducted progressively leading towards the development of ideal personality. They present a ladder (*sopāna-mārga*) for the layman. The eleven *Pratimas* are: (1) *samyagdrṣṭi* (right attitude), (2) *vrata* (practice of vows), (3) *sāmāyika* (equanimity), (4) *Proṣadha* (fasting on certain days of the month), (5) *sacittatyāga* (giving up certain types of food), (6) *rātribhojana-tyāga* (giving up eating at night), (7) *bramacarya* (celibacy) (8) *ārambha-tyāga* (giving up some occupations like agriculture), (9) *parigraha-tyāga* (giving up possessions except clothes), (10) *anumati-tyāga* (not participating in the matters about house-hold activities) and (11) *Uddiṣṭa-tyāga*. In this the *śrāvaka* has to wear only a *kaupīna* (a piece of cloth). There are slight variations in the list of practices presented by the Śvetāmbara and Digambara traditions.

74. *Tattvārthasūtra* : vii. 39 with commentary by Pūjyapāda.

75. *Uvāsagadasāo* : I. 89—Ācāradasāo 6.

"Savva-dhammarui yavibhavai, tassa ḷām bahūm silavyya guṇa (vvaya)—veramaṇa-paccakkāṇa-posahovavāsām no sammām patthaviya-puvviṁ bhavanti.....uvāsagapaṭimā upto abhava egārasamā uv. pa-savva, etc". I

76. Walther Schubring, *The Doctrine of the Jainas*, Translated from the revised German edition by Wolfgang Beurlen, Motilal Banarasidass, 1962 p. 285.

But these variations are of a minor nature. In these stages of spiritual practices there is a psychological acumen, as they present a gradual transformation and elevation from the life of a householder (*sravaka*) to the stages of *vānaprastha* and *sanyāsa*. At the eleventh stage one reaches the threshold of *sanyāsa*.

The Jainas have a conception of an ideal layman and ideal monk. A layman develops twenty-one qualities which distinguish him as a perfect gentleman. A true monk must possess twenty-eight qualities. He must be self-denying and he should endure hardships. He should aim at the highest ideal of spiritual perfection. Jainism presents a way of progress in life from the householder to the ascetic. There is a gradual development in the way towards self-realisation. In this sense, Jaina social ethics has great relevance to the modern society. The improvement of modern society is possible through the practice of moral and spiritual vows not to the extent to which a person who has renounced this world would do, but to the extent that is possible for a citizen keeping in view the personal and social responsibilities that he has to shoulder as a citizen. We may here refer to some of the problems and the practices that the *anuvrata* movement sponsored by Ācārya Tulasi. The *anuvrata* movement is moral and spiritual in charter for the development of society on solid moral and social foundations. We may just mention one aspect of the *anuvrata* practice, which is very much relevant to the building of a socialistic pattern of society. The *aparigraha vrata* is the fifth *vrata* in the Jaina ethics. For the monk it is *mahāvrata* and for the citizen it is *ānūvrata*. It is a lesser vow in the sense that it enables a citizen to practise the vow to the extent possible without ignoring the moral and the spiritual values involved in the vow. *Aparigrahavrata* as *anuvrata* is called *parimita parigrahavrata*. It consists in restricting one's possessions in respect of wealth, grain and other forms of material possessions. It also consists in not desiring these possessions beyond the limit which is self-imposed. *Parigraha* refers to possessions and *parigraha* is of two types: (1) Material possession (*Dravyaparigraha*) and (2) Psychic element like desire and attachment to the possessions (*bhavaparigraha*). The material possessions are of various types like wealth, other objects, land

(*Kṣetra*) and servants etc., There are ten *bāhya parigraha* articles mentioned in the *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā*.⁷⁷ The material possessions create a craving for them. The more we get them the more we want them. Desires are insatiable. The *antaraparigraha* is a psychic factor of attachment to the things of the world. There are fourteen types of *antaraparigraha*: (1) *Mithyātva* (perversity of outlook), (2) *Vēda* (feeling), (3) *Rāga* (attachment), (4) *dveṣa* (hatred), (5) *krodha* (anger), (6) *māna* (igoism), (7) *māyā* (infatuation), (8) *lobha* (greed), (9) *hāsyā* (laughter), (10) *rati* (sex infatuation), (11) *arati* (dislike), (12) *soka* (grief) (13) *bhaya* (fear) and (14) *jugupsā* (disgust).⁷⁸ These are the affective states corrupting the development of personality unless sublimated.⁷⁹ One of the important conditions of *parimita parigraha* would be that we should use the right means of acquiring possessions and also to limit the possessions on the basis of our own sweet will. Property earned by wrong and unrighteous means, even if it is within the self-imposed limit, must be considered as sinfull.⁸⁰

Present day society is beset with disvalues. We are blind to higher values of life. We hunger and thirst after wealth at the cost of the moral and spiritual considerations. We talk of socialism but we practise unlimited greed and amass wealth. Socialism brought by force, violence and hatred will not bring lasting happiness to man. If men have to give up their property and possessions, we have to enthuse them in the practice of the moral and spiritual way of life, of sacrifice and social service based on spiritual foundations. Our spiritual socialism built on the principles of love and sacrifice will be far superior to and more lasting than the committed socialism brought by force. Gandhiji spiritualised social and political life of our country to a great extent. If we want to lay the solid foundations of democracy and socialism, we have to depend upon the self-imposed restrictions.

77. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* : 281-282.

78. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvakācāra* : 61 and commentary.

79. *Kārtikeyānuprekṣā* : 281, 282, 336, 340.

80. *Ratnakaraṇḍaka Śrāvakācāra* : 62.

Jainism aims at effecting harmony between happiness and virtue. Attainment of virtue is possible with one's own efforts without the grace of any higher being. Dharma pervades the entire individual and social efforts for the highest ideal and for social perfection. The ethical ideal of a Jaina *śravāka* is neither self-indulgence nor self-negation. Like the two clods of clay, one wet and the other dry, flung at the wall, those who love pleasure get clung to the influx of karma. The passionless are free.⁸¹ Self-realisation should be the aim and the self to be realised is the transcendental self. "The empirical self is to be cared for and its energy is to be channelised in the direction of the attainment of the highest ideal of mokṣa"⁸²

Jainism does not recognise caste distinctions. All men are equal. If there are differences, they are only functional and they are based upon the vocations and the functions in society. Caste has nothing to do with self-realisation. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* cites an instance of Harīkeśa who attained the spiritual heights, although he was born an untouchable.⁸³ Caste does not determine the capability of moral and spiritual progress of an individual. Mahāvīra decried the tendencies that brought about inequality among men. He asked us to realise that one cannot be considered a kṣatriya or a brāhmaṇī by virtue of birth. One is a brāhmaṇī or kṣatriya by action.⁸⁴ One cannot become a śravaṇī by pulling one's hair, nor a brāhmaṇī by repeating Om-kāra mantra, a muni by residing in a forest nor an ascetic by wearing the bark of tree as clothes.⁸⁵ We find similar protests in Buddhism. The

81. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*:

82. Kalghatgi (T. G.): *Jaina View of Life*, pp. 163.

83. *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* : 25-33.

"Kammuṇa bambhūṇc hoi, Kammuṇshoi Khattiyo, 1, Vaiso
Kammuṇa hoi, Suddo hoi Kammuṇa 11".

84. *Ibid.*

85. "Na vi muṇḍaena samano, na omkārena bambhano I
Na muni raṇavāseṇam, kusacireṇa pa tāvaso II
also

"Samayāye samāṇo hoi, bambhacereṇa bambhāṇo I
Nānena muni hoi, tāvena hoi tāvaso". II

Buddha vehemently condemned those who made distinctions in caste. The story of Satyakāma Jābāla in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* presents this type of a catholic outlook of looking at society.⁸⁶

Of all the lives, the life of a human being is most important and is most precious. It is only as a human being one can make efforts to reach the highest end of self-realisation. But the tragic irony is that men forget their goal in life, they forget their predominant misery that they suffer in this life; they forget that life of pleasure is not the end but it is only an illusion, and above all, they forget that the fleeting pleasures of life are only momentary and would lead them astray. They get involved in the wheel of life and hanker for pleasures that may trickle out in the midst of continual pain. There is the famous parable in the *samarāiccakahā* (samarāditya kathā) which presents a poignant picture of the frantic and futile struggle of man for getting drops of uncertain pleasure in this ocean of misery.⁸⁷ It is said that a certain man, much oppressed by the woes of poverty, left his own home, and went to another country. One the way he passed through a land with its villages, cities and harbours. After a few days he lost his way. Thereafter, he came to a forest thick with trees and full of wild beasts. There, a fierce mad elephant started running towards him charging him with upraised trunk. At the same time there was before him a most evil demoness, holding a sharp sword, and rushing towards him. Seeing them, he trembled. He began to run in all direction. In the eastern direction, he saw a great banyan tree.

He ran quickly, and reached the mighty tree. But he could not climb the tree. Then he looked round and saw an old well covered with grass. Afraid of death, craving to live if only a moment longer, he flung himself into the well at the foot of the banyan tree. There, he caught hold of a clump of reeds and held them fast.

86. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*: iv, 4, 1, 4.

87. *Samarāiccakahā*: *2, 55-80.

While below him he saw terrible snakes enraged at the sound of his falling. At the very bottom was a very black and mighty python with its mouth agape and with terrible red eyes. Then he thought, "My life will only last as long as these reeds hold fast". And he raised his head and saw there on the clump of reeds two large mice, one white and one black, their sharp teeth gnawing at the roots of the reed-clump. Then up came the wild elephant. It was enraged. It charged at the trunk of the banyan tree. Due to the shock of this charge of the elephant, honeycomb on a large branch shook loose and fell. The man's whole body was stung by a swarm of angry bees, But just by chance a drop of honey fell on his head and rolled down his brow and somehow reached his lips. This gave him a moment of sweetness. He craved for more drops, and in the excitement of his craving for the drops of honey he thought nothing of python, the snake, the elephant and the impending disaster.

This is a powerful story meant to present the shallowness and the transitory nature of this world. It gives a poignant picture of the pathetic predominant misery in this life and man's folly to cling to the trilling drops of pleasure. The story is a symbolic presentation of the evil in this world and the various forces, like sense-pleasure and pain, alluring us to live this life and to forget the highest end.

Lord Mahavira said :—

'Do not cause injury to the living beings whether immovable or moving'.⁸⁸

'One who causes injury to living beings himself or gets it caused by others or consents to the cause of injury is his own enemy'.⁸⁹

88. *Uttarādhyayanasūtra*:

"Jāvanti Loe pāpa; tass Aduva thāvarā I
Te Jāṇamajāṇam vā, na haṇe no vi Ghāyaye" II

89. *Ibid.*

"Sayam tivāyae pāpe, aduvannohim Ghāyae I
Haṇantaṁ vāṇujāṇai, veram vaṇḍhai appaṇo" II

‘We should realise the other animals and beings are like us and knowing this we should avoid violence to other beings.’⁹⁰

Even then, we are likely to fall both intellectually and morally. We are likely to commit mistakes and cause misery to others. Lord Mahāvira says, “I crave forgiveness from all the creatures in the world and may all creatures forgive me. I crave love and friendship with all creatures and no enmity to any”.⁹¹

To conclude, the Jaina view of life is melioristic. *Anekānta* attitude pervades the Jaina way of life. It expresses the catholicity of outlook which has been very often ignored and misinterpreted. I may be permitted to quote the famous sanskrit verse of Akalanka vindicating catholicity of approach to the problems of life and thought as expressed in the *anekānta* attitude. He asks us to offer obescience to all those perfect beings, be he the Buddha Vṛadhamāna, Śatadilanilaya keśava or Śiva.

*Yo viśvam veda vedyam janana jala-nidherbhanginah pāradṛṣṭya,
Pourvāparyāviruddham vñcanamanupamam niṣkalankam yadiyam |
Tam vande sādhuvandyam sakalaguṇanidhim dhvastado-sadvisantam,
Buddham vā Vardhamānam Śatadalanilayam Keśavam vā
Śivam vā ||*

90. “Khāmemi savve jive savve jivā khamantu me I
Mitti me savvabhūsu veram majham na kepai” II

91. “Āyariye Uvajjhāe sise
Sāhammie kule-gaṇe ya I
Je me kei kasāya savve
Tivihāpa khāmemi” II

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Born in the year 1918 at Khanapur, India, Dr T. G. Kalghatgi took his Doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Karnataka in 1958. He has taught at several places, which include Rajaram College, Kolhapur, Wellingdon College, Sangli, Karnataka Arts College, Dharwar and at the Department of Philosophy, Karnataka University, for more than thirty-three years. He is at present Professor and Head of the Department of Jainology and Prakṛt at the University of Mysore.

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A prolific contributor to philosophy journals in India and abroad, Professor Kalghatgi is best known for *Some Problems in Jaina Psychology*, *Jaina View of Life*, *Karma and Re-birth*, *Jainism-A Study*, *Tirthankara Parsvanatha*. He has edited several books on Jainism both in Kannada and English, and has delivered several endowment lectures at various Universities in India.

In these lectures delivered in the University of Madras in March 1978, Professor Kalghatgi presents a coherent system of Jaina philosophy as found in the Prakṛt sources. The methodology adopted consists in clarifying precisely what the issues are, in explicating the concepts that are relevant for analysing the problem, in articulating the pertinent historical realities and finally in proffering arguments to show that the spirit of *anekānta* pervades the entire Jaina philosophy.

Professor Kalghatgi's work is the fruit of deep religious conviction and a fine philosophical intellect equally at home in Orient and Western thought.